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Abstract 
 
China, like a number of other antitrust jurisdictions, has a law concerning unfair 
pricing.  This article develops an economic framework for applying the unfair pricing law 
in China. The framework draws on the experience of courts and competition authorities in 
other jurisdictions and the writings of various commentators, particularly economists, on 
unfair pricing in those jurisdictions. It shows that virtually all jurisdictions have decided to 
consider unfair pricing claims only in exceptional circumstances, and rarely, if ever, in 
innovation-intensive industries. For those cases that pass this screen and receive 
consideration, the courts and competition authorities then, under the leading test, insist on 
substantial evidence that the price is significantly higher than cost and is unfair given the 
value provided to the buyer.  This article shows that the exceptional circumstances screen 
and the rigorous unfair pricing test are motivated by a recognition, supported by substantial 
empirical evidence, that successful firms must have the assurance of receiving significant 
rewards to induce them to invest time and capital in highly risky innovation that is the 
source of economic growth and welfare. It concludes by showing that this approach is 
consistent with modern Chinese economic policy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Article 17(1) of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) prohibits 
dominant firms from “selling commodities at unfairly high prices or buying 
commodities at unfairly low prices.”1 Many jurisdictions have similar laws.  
The European Union, for example, prohibits dominant firms from 
“imposing unfair purchase or selling prices.”2 As a result there is an 
extensive body of decisions by courts and regulatory authorities that the 
NDRC and courts in China can draw on in considering how to shape the 
application of Article 17 in China. In addition, the United States, Canada, 
Australia and many other jurisdictions have chosen not to adopt unfair 
pricing laws.  Their reasons for not doing so are informative as well. 
Many jurisdictions have found that the thorniest issues concerning 
pricing by dominant firms arise in industries in which innovation is a 
significant driver of firm success and competitive dynamics. They have 
recognized that they must consider the impact of excessive pricing 
prohibitions on innovation. Moreover, economists have also found that 
determining whether prices are “too high” is a very complex question in 
innovation-intensive industries. 
This article describes economic evidence that the NDRC and courts, as 
well as the parties before them, could consider in evaluating whether prices 
are too high under the AML and, in the case of the NDRC, to pursue an 
unfair pricing investigation in the first place.3 We focus on situations in 
which innovation has been or continues to be an important element of the 
dynamic competitive process. We take a broad view of innovation. It 
always begins with human ingenuity but often entails taking considerable 
personal and financial risk.  Some innovative industries tend to rely on 
using intellectual property rights to protect their efforts. Others do not and 
sometimes cannot. 
Our analysis synthesizes the learning of courts, competition authorities, 
and economists that have considered unfair pricing and its relationship to 
                                                
1 See Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China, [2008] Presidential 
Order No. 68, August 30, 2007. The Chinese version is available at 
http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2007-08/30/content_732591.htm; an unofficial translation of the 
AML is available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Oct07_Bush10_1
8f.authcheckdam.pdf.  
2 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU), Article 102(a), Mar. 25, 1957, C 326/89. 
3 Whenever we use the term “unfair price” in this article we are referring to an 
“excessive price” that is “too high.” We therefore do not consider the other application of 
the unfair pricing law that concerns when prices are “too low” including the situation in 
which a firm with buyer power insists on “low prices.”  
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innovation. It concludes that innovators take large risks ex ante because of 
the possibility for earning large rewards ex post.  Robust involvement by 
antitrust regulators in adjudicating “unfair” or “excessive” prices can 
distort—or even eliminate—the very incentives that drive innovation to 
begin with.  This provides sound economic justification for antitrust 
regulators’ traditional hesitation to interfere with the determination by 
markets of what constitutes a “fair” price. 
We recognize that, as China develops its approach to excessive pricing 
cases under the AML, it will need to take into account the particular 
circumstances of China.4 Those circumstances support the application of the 
principles discussed above. 
China has moved rapidly since the late 1970s towards relying on a 
decentralized market mechanism to drive the economy forward and improve 
the lives of consumers. Reforms in the last three decades have created a 
surge of entrepreneurship and innovation in various sectors in China. This 
includes entrepreneurs starting businesses, state-owned and private 
enterprises initiating innovation (encouraged and sponsored by the 
government), and foreign companies entering China and bringing in 
additional technology and know-how. This has resulted in part from policies 
which enable entrepreneurs to secure rewards for the risks they took by 
allowing them to charge what the market will bear for their product. As a 
result, China has been one of the most dynamic market economies in the 
world. Innovation by Chinese companies has grown significantly, and the 
Chinese economy is increasingly innovation-driven.5  
In this environment the authorities have powerful reasons not to impose 
price regulation on innovation-intensive industries, since that would 
eliminate or reduce the incentive to innovate. In fact, recognizing this, 
China has, as a matter of government policy, decided to rely mainly on the 
market to determine prices and has, under the leadership of the NDRC, 
gradually eliminated most price regulation during the process of reforms. 
This policy is particularly critical for innovation-intensive industries for 
which price regulation would distort economic efficiency and eliminate or 
reduce the incentives to innovate, incentives which have been responsible 
for rapid economic growth in the past thirty years.  Therefore, the specific 
situation in China implies that it should act consistently with international 
norms in rarely, if ever, using unfair pricing laws to impose price caps on 
                                                
4 See generally, David S. Evans (2009), Why Different Jurisdictions Do Not (and 
Should Not) Adopt the Same Antitrust Rules, 10 Chi. J. Int’l L. 161. 
5 See Juro Osawa and Paul Mozur, “The Rise of China’s Innovation Engine,” Wall 
Street Journal, January 17, 2014, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303819704579320544231396168. 
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firms in innovation-intensive industries.6 
The article is organized as follows. 
Section II describes the role of unfair pricing in competition policy in 
jurisdictions around the world.  It shows that antitrust authorities, including 
all major ones, rarely if ever initiate unfair pricing cases and that the courts 
impose very stringent tests for the few unfair pricing cases that reach them. 
One of their primary concerns in adopting this approach is that regulating 
prices of dominant firms discourages the innovation and risk taking that is 
the key to economic progress. 
Section III presents the economic rationales for competition authorities 
and courts taking this extremely cautious approach towards pricing by 
dominant firms. It documents the critical role of new products and 
technologies in economic growth.  It shows that most of the firms which try 
to create new products and technologies fail and that limiting the rewards to 
the few entrepreneurs who succeed at innovation ex post reduces the 
number of entrepreneurs who make risky investments ex ante. Limiting the 
returns of the winners thereby depresses the flow of new products and 
technologies and slows economic progress. 
Section IV summarizes the two-part test for unfair pricing that has been 
adopted by the EU and other jurisdictions. The first prong considers 
whether a price is high in the sense that it enables the seller to earn a supra-
competitive profit. If it does, then the second prong considers whether a 
price is high relative to the value provided to the buyer.  The courts and 
competition authorities have recognized that developing evidence for both 
prongs of the test entails many difficulties. This section shows that it is 
much more difficult to assess unfair pricing in innovation-intensive 
industries, thereby providing another significant reason for taking an 
extremely cautious approach towards unfair pricing by dominant firms in 
these industries. 
Section V presents an economic framework for assessing excessive 
pricing claims in innovation-intensive industries in China. It suggests that 
the unfair pricing regulations7 adopted by the NDRC would encompass 
many pricing practices that are common in competitive markets and 
ultimately good for consumers, and that the NDRC should consider a more 
targeted approach similar to that used in other jurisdictions. As a special 
case it considers industries in which intellectual property rights are 
important.  It argues that interventions in the context of excessive pricing 
concerning intellectual property should be limited to situations in which a 
                                                
6 See Jean-Jacques Laffont and Claudia Senik-Leygonie, Price Controls and the 
Economics of Institutions in China, 1997. 
7 Article 11 of the NDRC Anti-Price Monopoly Regulations, NDRC Order No. 7, 
December 29, 2010, available at http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2011-01/04/content_1777969.htm. 
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dominant firm uses intellectual property rights to eliminate or exclude 
competition, as required under Article 55 of the AML.  
Section VI presents brief conclusions. 
II. THE ROLE OF UNFAIR PRICING IN COMPETITION POLICY 
 
We consider the European Union first. It has the most well developed 
body of law on unfair pricing by dominant firms.  The law itself is more 
than half a century old. The European Court of Justice issued a seminal 
decision in 1978 that has influenced the decisional practice and court cases 
at the European Commission and at national competition authorities. We 
then turn to the United States that, at more than 120 years, has the longest 
history of antitrust enforcement. We conclude with a summary of a survey 
of 24 jurisdictions that participated in the OECD Roundtable concerning 
excessive pricing laws in 2011. 8 
A.  European Union  
The European Union has developed a notably cautious approach to 
unfair pricing claims.  The 1957 Treaty of Rome, which is the original 
constitutional basis for the European Union, prohibited dominant firms 
from engaging in what are now termed “exclusionary abuses,” such as 
exclusive dealing, predatory pricing, and tying. It also prohibited them from 
engaging in “exploitative abuses,” such as unfair pricing and the imposition 
of unfair trading conditions.9 At the time, few countries outside of the 
United States, Australia, and Canada had antitrust laws.10  None of those 
countries prohibited unfair pricing and other exploitative abuses by 
dominant firms.11 
                                                
8  European Commission, “Article 102 and Excessive Prices,” in OECD Policy 
Roundtables: Excessive Prices (2011), 309-322, available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/competition/abuse/49604207.pdf. 
9 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU), Article 102(a), Mar. 25, 1957, C 326/89. 
10 Xavier Vives (2009), “Competition Policy in Europe,” in Xavier Vives (ed), 
Competition Policy in the EU: Fifty Years on from the Treaty of Rome, at p. 1. 
11 The origin of the prohibition against unfair pricing in the Treaty is not known. The 
prohibition is, however, consistent with the influence of the German Ordoliberal School on 
the formation and early years of European Community competition law. The Ordoliberal 
School argued that dominant firms should be forced to behave “as if” they were 
competitive firms. One way of doing that, in the view of this school of thought, was to 
force these firms to charge the prices that competitive firms would charge. See Christian 
Ahlborn and Carsten Grave (2006), Walter Eucken and Ordoliberalism: An Introduction 
from a Consumer Welfare Perspective, 2 Competition Policy Int’l 197 and Michal Gal 
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The European Commission decided to use its powers to regulate unfair 
pricing sparingly.  By the early 1970s the European Commission had made 
it clear that “measures to halt the abuse of dominant position cannot be 
converted into systematic monitoring of prices.”12 The Commission was 
more explicit in 1994. It indicated that: 
 
The existence of a dominant position is not itself against the rules of 
competition. Consumers can suffer from a dominant firm exploiting this 
position, the most likely way being through prices higher than would be 
found if the market were subject to effective competition. However, the 
Commission in its decision-making practice does not normally control 
or condemn the high level of prices as such.13 
 
Instead, the Commission said it would focus on regulating practices against 
competitors or new entrants taken by the dominant firm to preserve its 
position.14 The Commission explained its reasoning in a 2011 submission to 
the OECD,15  
 
It is nonetheless important to recognise that high profits may often be 
the result of superior innovation and risk taking, which should not be 
penalised as this would work as a disincentive to innovate and invest…. 
[T]his does not mean that intervention against exploitative conduct 
should necessarily be totally excluded but it indicates that it may be 
better to tilt the balance in favour of addressing exclusionary conduct. 
 
In the nearly 60 years since the adoption of a European competition law, 
the European Commission has held to this policy and brought few excessive 
pricing cases. It has reached only six formal decisions concerning excessive 
pricing between 1957 and 2013, barely one per decade.16 By way of 
                                                                                                                       
(2004), “Monopoly Pricing as an Antitrust Offense in the U.S. and the EC: Two Systems of 
Belief About Monopoly?” Antitrust Bulletin 49 343-384.  The scientific understanding of 
how competition works to advance the economy and the role of antitrust in promoting 
competition (and how poor antitrust enforcement can hamper competition) has advanced 
considerably since the Treaty was written. The European Commission and courts, like 
authorities and courts in other jurisdictions, have adjusted their approach to competition 
issues in light of new learning. 
12 38th Annual Report on Competition Policy (1975), paragraph 3. 
13 XXIVth Annual Report on Competition Policy 1994. 
14 Id. 
15  European Commission, “Article 102 and Excessive Prices,” in OECD Policy 
Roundtables: Excessive Prices (2011), 309-322, available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/competition/abuse/49604207.pdf, at 311. 
16 Id., and Massimo Motta and Alexandre de Streel (2007), “Excessive Pricing in 
Competition Law: Never say Never,” in Arvid Fredenberg and Niklas Strand (eds), The 
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comparison, the Commission had reached 50 decisions concerning abuse of 
dominance by 2004.17  
The European courts have also taken a skeptical view of the few unfair 
pricing cases that they have reviewed. According to Motta and de Streel, the 
European courts had rendered opinions in about 15 cases as of the mid-
2000s.18 They note that most of these cases involved unfair prices that 
resulted in the exclusion of competitors and the remainder involved firms, 
such as the post office, which had legal monopolies or were dominant firms 
in regulated industries such as energy.19  The only case in which the 
European courts rendered an opinion on an excessive pricing abuse that did 
not have an associated exclusionary abuse and in which the firm did not 
have a legal or regulated monopoly was United Brands, in which the 
European Court of Justice found the Commission’s evidence lacking.20  
                                                                                                                       
Pros and Cons of High Prices, at 30. According to the 2011 report submitted by the 
Commission to OECD, Rambus is the only case considered by the Commission since 2007 
that alleged excessive prices. In this case Rambus was accused of having engaged in 
deceptive practices during the standard setting process. This is therefore a case in which the 
excessive pricing abuse was accompanied by anticompetitive behavior. Rambus entered 
into a series of commitments with the Commission and the Commission did not render a 
final decision concerning whether Rambus had abused a dominant position.  Commission 
Decision of 9.12.2009 Relating to a Proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European union and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case 
COM/38.636 - Rambus), OJ (2010) C 30/17. 
17 Martin Carree, Andrea Gunster and Maarten Pieter Schinkel (2010), “European 
Policy 1957-2004: An Analysis of Commission Decisions,”  Review of Industrial 
Organization, 36 (2) at 110. 
18 Motta and de Streel, op. cit. at 31. That number is greater than the number of 
Commission decisions because many of the cases considered by the European courts 
involved requests for guidance on the application of EU competition law from national 
courts of EU Member States. 
19 As we discuss in more detail below, the focus on legal monopolies addresses 
situations in which a single company has government-established control over an entire 
industry; it does not refer to government grants of intellectual property.  There is a 
consensus that unfair pricing law should generally not be applied to intellectual property 
except insofar as it is related to an exclusionary abuse. 
20 According to the European Commission, “The case law described above shows that 
the Commission and European Courts addressed the question of excessive prices only in 
markets with an entrenched dominant position where entry and expansion of competitors 
could not be expected to ensure effective competition in the foreseeable future. In General 
Motors and Deutsche Post there was a legal monopoly, in Bodson the dominant position 
was based on an accumulation of exclusive concessions which shielded a significant part of 
the market from competition, in SACEM a national monopoly based on network effects, in 
Helsingborg a kind of natural monopoly and in Rambus a dominant position based on a 
lock-in effect once an industry standard has been adopted. The only exception is the United 
Brands case, which concerned the market for (green) bananas, but in the end the Court did 
not find excessive prices in this case.”  European Commission, “Article 102 and Excessive 
Prices,” in OECD Policy Roundtables: Excessive Prices, 309-322 (2011), available at: 
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This review shows that the European Commission has used its 
discretion in rarely reaching decisions that find the dominant firms to 
engage in unfair pricing and that the European courts then uphold unfair 
pricing decisions only in special situations. 
B.  United States 
Courts and antitrust authorities in the United States have gone even 
further than those of the European Union in seeking to protect market-
driven innovation incentives from interference.  The antitrust laws of the 
United States do not have any provisions that would limit the prices which 
firms with significant market power could charge their customers. From 
their inception in the late 19th century, the U.S. antitrust laws have permitted 
firms, including those with monopoly power, to charge prices that would 
enable them to earn significant, including arguably supra-competitive, 
profits.21 Writing in 1945 in U.S. v. Alcoa, Judge Learned Hand presented 
what has become the classic explanation for the U.S. approach.22  
 
[A] strong argument can be made that, although the result may expose 
the public to the evils of monopoly, the Act does not mean to condemn 
the resultant of those very forces which it is its prime object to foster: 
finis opus coronat [the end crowns the work]. The successful 
competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon 
when he wins. 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed this view in its decision in Verizon v. 
Trinko in 2004. Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice Scalia noted,23 
 
The opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least for a short 
period—is what attracts “business acumen” in the first place; it induces 
risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth. To safeguard 
the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power will not be 
                                                                                                                       
http://www.oecd.org/competition/abuse/49604207.pdf, at 317. In the Rambus case, even 
the lock-in effect was not enough; Rambus was accused of engaging in deceptive practices 
which thereby distorted the competitive process of determining whether it would secure 
inclusion in a standard. Commission Decision of 9.12.2009 Relating to a Proceeding under 
Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European union and Article 54 of the 
EEA Agreement (Case COM/38.636 - Rambus), OJ (2010) C 30/17. 
21 David S. Evans and Keith N. Hylton (2008), The Lawful Acquisition and Exercise of 
Monopoly Power and its Implications for the Objectives of Antitrust, 4 Competition Policy 
Int’l 203. 
22 United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).  
23 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 407 
(2004). 
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found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of 
anticompetitive conduct.  
 
In summarizing the state of U.S. law on excessive pricing the U.S. 
Department of Justice in their submission to the OECD Roundtable noted,24 
 
U.S. antitrust law allows lawful monopolists, and a fortiori other market 
participants, to set their prices as high as they choose. This central tenet 
of U.S. antitrust law is well supported by court decisions that have held, 
for example, that “[a] pristine monopolist…may charge as high a rate as 
the market will bear” and that “[a] natural monopolist that acquired and 
maintained its monopoly without excluding competitors by improper 
means is not guilty of ‘monopolizing’ in violation of the Sherman 
Act…and can therefore charge any price that it wants,… for the antitrust 
laws are not a price-control statute or a public utility or common-carrier 
rate-regulation statute.” 
 
According to the U.S. Department of Justice, “limiting the freedom to set 
prices may well conflict with the underlying premise of antitrust policy, i.e. 
promoting a robust competitive process that produces high-quality, 
innovative goods at low prices.”25 
C.  Other Jurisdictions 
Other jurisdictions have adopted a similar skepticism towards excessive 
pricing theories. Twenty-three countries plus the supra-national European 
Union made submissions to the OECD in 2011.26 Four of those jurisdictions 
have competition laws that do not treat unfair pricing by dominant firms as 
a possible abuse: Australia, Indonesia, Mexico, and the United States. 
Nineteen of those jurisdictions have competition laws that do treat unfair 
pricing by dominant firms as a possible abuse. These include Brazil, Chile, 
India, Indonesia, Israel, Russia, South Korea, Switzerland, Chinese Taipei, 
and Turkey, as well as nine EU member states that apply EU law (Bulgaria, 
the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Lithuania, and the United Kingdom). 
All of the countries that have excessive pricing prohibitions appear to 
take an “exceptional circumstances” approach based on their submissions to 
                                                
24 U.S. Federal Trade Commission and Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of 
Justice, “Excessive Prices,” in OECD Policy Roundtables: Excessive Prices (2011), 299-
308, available at: http://www.oecd.org/competition/abuse/49604207.pdf, at 299. 
25 Id., p. 2. 
26 OECD Policy Roundtables: Excessive Prices (2011), available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/competition/abuse/49604207.pdf 
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the OECD. They bring few cases, and only in special circumstances.27 As 
the OECD notes, “In general, excessive price cases are conducted 
infrequently even within those jurisdictions that prohibit and enforce 
excessive price provisions.” Some, such as Brazil and India, have excessive 
pricing laws but have never brought a case.  
 
III. THE ECONOMIC BASIS FOR THE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES SCREEN 
FOR UNFAIR PRICING 
 
There is a consensus among jurisdictions around the world that 
competition laws should rarely, if ever, limit the prices that dominant firms 
can charge their customers. Jurisdictions are reticent to use antitrust laws to 
impose price caps on dominant firms, as we have seen from the quotes in 
the previous section, primarily because of the impact that this would have 
on the incentives for individuals and firms to make the risky investments of 
time and capital that are the source of innovation and ultimately economic 
growth. They are also hesitant because the determination of prices through 
market forces has empirically proved more efficient than having the 
government set prices. All these concerns are heightened when it comes to 
innovation-intensive industries and especially those involving intellectual 
property. 
A.  Consumer Welfare; Static Competition Models Are Unreliable 
Economists have developed a simplified model to show how firms 
would set their prices in a hypothetical perfectly competitive industry and 
ignoring any dynamic aspects of competition. This model is sometimes 
cited as part of a justification for regulating the prices of dominant firms. It 
is therefore useful to explain this model and the assumptions behind it.  As 
shown below, the model does not account for risk taking, innovation, and 
other dynamic behavior, which has rightly led competition authorities and 
courts to recognize that this elementary model does not provide a sound 
basis for the application of prohibitions on “excessive” or “unreasonably 
high” prices.    
                                                
27  For example, the competition authority in the UK, much like the European 
Commission, has had a policy of not pursuing excessive pricing cases except when the 
excessive pricing is associated with an exclusionary practice. See, for example, J Vickers, 
“How Does the Prohibition of Abuse of Dominance Fit with the Rest of Competition 
Policy?” (6 June 2003), available at: http://www.oft.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/660C15CB-
6F9E-41F5-A370-61F6EE022CB3/0/spe0303.pdf, (July 22, 2004). 
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According to the basic textbook model, shown in Figure 1, consumers 
get the greatest welfare when firms expand output to the point where price 
equals the marginal cost of production including a competitive rate of 
return. Welfare is measured by the large shaded triangle.  In this basic 
model, competition generally drives firms to produce and price at that level.  
 
 
Figure 1.  
 
 
Firms with significant market power, however, can earn more profit by 
charging higher prices and producing less output. A monopoly, for example, 
would increase price and reduce output as shown in Figure 2. As a result 
consumers pay more for a smaller amount of output (and therefore lose the 
area shown by C+D) and do not get QC-QM units of output that they valued 
by the amount shown by E.  Under this simplified model consumers lose the 
areas C+D+E.  
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Figure 2 
 
 
 
This textbook model of competition provides an obvious although 
highly simplistic definition of an excessive price. It would imply that any 
price greater than marginal cost—the competitive level that maximizes 
consumer welfare—is excessive and unfair to consumers.28 If we could 
force dominant firms to lower price to marginal cost then consumers would 
get more welfare in this simple static model—at least on the blackboard. 
Although this simplified model is useful for teaching basic concepts, it 
is not properly applied to determine if prices are “excessive.”  That is 
because the emphasis on marginal cost fails to account for the critical 
reality that firms assume costs and risks in jumping into the competitive 
fray. Profits need to reward them for doing so and compensate for the fixed 
costs of setting up a business. Eliminating those profits takes away the 
incentives that firms have for participating in a battle that most will not 
survive as we document below. Market prices, moreover, are signals that 
                                                
28 A slightly more complex model would recognize that there are fixed costs and that 
the marginal firm must get a price at least equal to its average total cost inclusive of a 
competitive rate of return. 
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other firms consider when deciding whether to enter―either because there 
is demand or because they can operate more efficiently than existing firms. 
Competition authorities have resisted employing a competition policy that 
would set prices through marginal-cost pricing for the same reasons 
countries globally, including China, have moved from government to 
market-based price setting for virtually all goods and services. 
B.  Innovation, Rewards, and Economic Progress 
There is considerable empirical economic support for this policy. First, 
there is substantial empirical evidence that economic progress and long-
term social welfare are driven by innovation that leads to the creation of 
new products and services, new technologies that facilitate the introduction 
of new products and services, and the creation of more efficient ways to 
produce goods and services. 29  Second, there is substantial empirical 
evidence that this innovation results from dynamic competition in which 
most entrepreneurs, inventors and firms that try their hands at innovation 
fail to succeed.30 Third, there is substantial empirical evidence that the 
process of innovation and dynamic competition that results in new products 
and technologies is driven by a reward structure in which the few that 
succeed get highly compensated and the preponderance that do not succeed 
get little, if anything.31 
These three empirical findings have an immediate implication for 
government policies towards prices in innovation-intensive industries.32 
Interventions that reduce the prices innovators may charge for their new 
inventions have the effect of reducing the incentives to undertake risky 
investments in innovation. These interventions thereby slow economic 
progress and reduce long-term social welfare. 
                                                
29 For a general discussion of the evidence on innovation and economic growth see 
Robert J. Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (2004), Economic Growth (2nd ed.) at chapters 6-
7. 
30 Gerben can der Panne, Cees van Beers, and Alfred Kleinknecht (2003), “Success 
and Failure of Innovation: A Literature Review,” International Journal of Innovation 
Management, 7(3), 309-338. 
31 F.M. Scherer and Dietmar Harhoff (2000), “Technology Policy for a World of 
Skew-Distributed Outcomes,” Research Policy, 29, 559-566. 
32 Although we focus on innovation-intensive industries these principles apply broadly 
to market economies since innovation can potentially disrupt any industry and in fact might 
be most likely to disrupt industries in which innovation is lethargic. Modern 
communication innovations such as IMS, SMS, and micro-blogging have, for example, 
created value by disrupting postal monopolies and monopoly or dominant firms in basic 
land-line telecommunications.  
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1. New Products 
The most well developed empirical work on the value of innovation 
concerns new products. We begin with the theory. Assume that a firm 
creates a new product. Consider the extreme case in which the firm has a 
monopoly over the new product. Figure 2, above, shows the standard 
monopoly pricing model in which, to maximize profit, the firm produces 
out to the point where marginal revenue equals marginal cost and charges 
what the market will bear for this amount.  Before the firm introduced the 
new product, consumers obviously were not obtaining any consumer 
welfare from it. After the firm introduces the new product, consumers 
obtain consumer surplus shown by the difference between what they are 
willing to pay and the price the monopoly charges. That area is shaded in 
the diagram. 
Economists have done many studies of the value generated by new 
products. These studies take into account the fact that new products 
substitute in part for existing products. They calculate the net increase in 
consumer welfare after accounting for this substitution. 
The classic study in this area examined the value created when General 
Mills, which had produced an oat-based cereal called Cheerios since 1941, 
introduced Apple Cinnamon Cheerios in 1988. As the name suggests, 
General Mills added apple and cinnamon flavoring to their basic cereal.  
Professor Jerry Hausman found through a careful econometric study that 
this “new product” generated $66.8 million per year of additional consumer 
value.33   Subsequent studies have found that other new products generate 
significant consumer value.34 
                                                
33  Jerry A. Hausman, “Valuation of New Goods Under Perfect and Imperfect 
Competition,” in The Economics of New Goods, ed. Timothy F. Bresnahan and Robert J. 
Gordon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). 
34 Christian Broda and David E. Weinstein (2006), “Globalization and the Gains from 
Variety,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(2) 541-585 (the value to U.S. consumers of 
the expanded import varieties between 1972 and 2001 was 2.6 percent of U.S. GDP); Abe 
Dunn (2012), “Drug Innovations and Welfare Measures Computed from Market Demand: 
The Case of Anti-cholesterol Drugs,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 
4(3) 167-189 (the introduction of new varieties of anti-cholesterol drugs between 1996 and 
2007 in the U.S. led to a 27 percent drop in a constant-quality price index); Matthew 
Gentzkow (2007), “Valuing New Goods in a Model with Complementarities: Online 
Newspapers,” American Economic Review, 97(3) 713-744 (The existence of the online 
newspaper post.com generates $45 million per year in consumer surplus);  Austan 
Goolsbee and Peter J. Klenow (2006), “Valuing Consumer Products by the Time Spent 
Using Them: An Application to the Internet,” American Economic Review, 96(2) 108-113 
(the consumer surplus from the Internet is equal to 2% of annual full-income in the U.S.); 
Austan Goolsbee and Amil Petrin (2004), “The Consumer Gains from Direct Broadcast 
Satellites and the Competition with Cable TV,” Econometrica, 72(2) 351-381 (in the U.S., 
direct broadcast satellites generate welfare gains of $2.5 billion per year for consumers who 
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These empirical studies confirm and quantify what is obvious from our 
experience with innovation in our daily lives. New products and services 
such as smart mobile phones, micro-blogging, e-commerce, and search 
engines have provided tremendous value. In China, these new products and 
services in information communications and technology industries have 
promoted industrial upgrading and transformation, helping China’s 
industrial structure change from labor-intensive to knowledge-intensive.35 
New technologies are extremely valuable because they facilitate the 
introduction of many new products.  Consider mobile communication 
technologies. Those technologies have supported the creation of a vast array 
of projects ranging from the most basic mobile handset working on a 2G 
network to SMS communication methods, such as weibo, to mobile 
payments. Moreover, these technologies were the foundation of the 
hundreds of thousands of applications, many of which are themselves new 
products, that run on smart phones.  China’s Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology (MIIT) found that in the first three years of its 
introduction the 3G technology standard used for smart mobile phones in 
China had created 1.23 million new jobs and RMB 211 billion in direct 
GDP growth.36 Many other technologies, ranging from the Internet in recent 
                                                                                                                       
get television using them and an additional welfare gain of $3 billion per year for cable TV 
subscribers who benefit from reduced prices due to competition from direct broadcast 
satellites); Jerry Hausman, “Mobile Telephone,” in Martin E. Cave, Sumit K. Majumdar, 
and Ingo Vogelsang (2002), Handbook of Telecommunications Economics, Vol. 1: 
Structure, Regulation, and Competition (mobile phones in the U.S. generated consumer 
surplus of $24.2 to $49.8 billion in 1994 and $52.8 to $111 billion in 1999); Donghun Kim 
(2004), “Estimation of the Effects of New Brands on Incumbents: Profits and Consumer 
Welfare: The U.S. Processed Cheese Market Case,” Review of Industrial Organization, 
25(3) 275-293 (the introduction of three new brands of low-fat cheese in the U.S. between 
1988 and 1992 led to an increase in consumer welfare of $43.2 million in 1992); Ariel 
Pakes (2003), “A Reconsideration of Hedonic Price Indexes With An Application to PC’s,” 
American Economic Review, 93(5) 1578-1614 (if the U.S. price index for PC’s is adjusted 
to reflect welfare gains from new model introductions, then U.S. PC prices declined by 15-
19 percent per year over 1995-1999, rather than remaining basically the same); Amil Petrin 
(2002), “Quantifying the Benefits of New Products: The Case of the Minivan,” Journal of 
Political Economy, 110(4) 705-729 (the introduction of minivans in the U.S. increased 
consumer welfare by a total of $2.8 billion over 1984-1988); Manuel Trajtenberg (1989), 
“The Welfare Analysis of Product Innovations, with an Application to Computed 
Tomography Scanners,” Journal of Political Economy, 97(2) 444-479 (the welfare gains 
for U.S. customers that bought CAT Scanners in 1974 from having the 1974 choice set 
rather than the 1973 set was $9.8 billion in 1982 US$). 
35 Ping Li, Feitao Jiang, and Hongwei Wang (June 2013), “Industrial Upgrading and 
Innovation in the Information Age,” Journal of Engineering Studies, Vol. 5(2).   
36 MIIT Press Release, MIIT Explains the Issuance of 4G Operation Licenses, 
December 4, 2013, available at 
www.miit.gov.cn/n11293472/n11293832/n11293907/n11368223/15748225.html. 
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times to electricity long ago, have similarly provided the foundation for the 
creation of many valuable new products.   
Let us return, though, to the simple new product example. One could 
argue that the monopoly is short-changing consumers because it is not 
producing at marginal cost and therefore imposing the losses shown in 
Figure 2.  That comparison is wrong for two reasons. First, the 
economically correct comparison is between the welfare consumers had 
before the introduction of the new product and afterwards. Their welfare 
has improved by the shaded area.  Second, taking away the reward for 
innovation would reduce the amount of investment and effort that go into 
innovation and thereby reduce future benefits consumers would receive 
from new products and technologies. 
2. Success and Failure Rates for Innovation 
A number of studies done in the United States show that creating new 
products, technologies, and other innovations, is similar to a lottery in terms 
of the reward structure.  Innovators, entrepreneurs and firms compete in 
races to create new categories of products and services for consumers.  
Almost all of the participants in the competitive process fail.  The few that 
survive often obtain significant rewards—the crown described by Judge 
Hand—for their efforts. Almost everyone else loses the capital they have 
invested as well as the opportunity cost of their time. 
Gort and Klepper, for example, examined the development of industries 
for 46 new products in the United States.37  They found that dozens (or in a 
couple of cases, hundreds) of firms entered these industries in the early 
years. Many of these firms imitated early innovators.  Over time many of 
these firms exited the industries. The competitive process revealed the firms 
that could operate most efficiently and provide the greatest benefits to 
consumers. 
Other studies have documented that most entrepreneurs that start 
businesses fail within four years.  Recent studies for the United States have 
found that about half of all new businesses, weighted by employment, exit 
less than 4-5 years after entry.38 Studies for other countries have reached 
                                                
37 Michael Gort and Steven Klepper (1982), “Time Paths in the Diffusion of Product 
Innovations,” Economic Journal, 92(367) 630-653. 
38 John Haltiwanger, Ron S. Jarmin, and Javier Miranda (2013), “Who Creates Jobs? 
Small Versus Large Versus Young,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 95(2) 347-361, at 
358 (“…the cumulative employment weighted exit rate derived from figure 5 implies that 
about 47% of the jobs created by start-ups are eliminated by firm exits in the first five 
years.”). Note that this figure is employment-weighted. Since smaller firms are more likely 
to exit, the unweighted exit rate would be higher. Another study reported that only 44 
percent of new businesses still existed after 4 years. Amy E. Knaup (2005), “Survival and 
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similar conclusions. A study of manufacturing startups in the Netherlands 
found that less than 70 percent had survived after three years.39 A study of 
startups in the western states of Germany found that less than 65 percent 
survived after two years and that less than 50 percent had survived after five 
years. 40  Another study of startups in the German state of Baden-
Württemberg found that 20 percent failed after two years and 40 percent 
had failed after five years.41 
Hall and Woodward, to take another example, studied the experience of 
entrepreneurs who received venture funding between 1987 and 2008 in the 
United States. Venture capital firms invest in very few of the proposals that 
are presented to them.42  As a result, the entrepreneurs considered by these 
authors have already gone through a rigorous screening process.  They 
found that over a third of ventures exited with a value of zero within five 
years. About 75 percent of entrepreneurs that exited before the end of their 
data (and about 50 percent of all entrepreneurs) received nothing from their 
efforts. 43  Figure 3 shows the distribution of exit values received by 
entrepreneurs. It reflects the common finding concerning innovation: the 
returns are highly skewed with most innovations earning nothing and a few 
earning a large amount. 
Some studies have examined the success of R&D efforts by 
                                                                                                                       
Longevity in the Business Employment Dynamics Data,” Monthly Labor Review, 128(5), 
at 51-52. 
39 David Audertsch, Patrick Houweling and Roy Thurik (2000), “Firm Survival in the 
Netherlands,” Review of Industrial Organization, 16(1), at p. 5. The authors note that their 
data sample under-samples the smallest firms, and that this means that that survival times 
will be biased upwards. Id, at p. 3. 
40 Michael Fritsch, Udo Brixy and Oliver Falck (2006), “The Effect of Industry, 
Region, and Time on New Business Survival: A Multi-Dimensional Analysis,” Review of 
Industrial Organization, 28(3), at pp. 292-295. This study also found that manufacturing 
startups failed less frequently during the first few years than service startups, which may 
explain the lower survival rates than in the Dutch study. 
41 Harald Strotmann (2007), “Entrepreneurial Survival,” Small Business Economics, 
28(1), at pp. 91-92. 
42 Dixon (1989) surveyed UK venture capital funds and reported that 3.4 percent of 
proposals were funded. Robert Dixon (1989), “Venture Capitalists and Investment 
Appraisal,” National Westminster Bank Quarterly Review, 2-21. More recently, a Forbes 
column reported that venture capitalists finance 1-2 percent of proposals. Dileep Rao, 
“Why 99.95% Of Entrepreneurs Should Stop Wasting Time Seeking Venture Capital,” 
Forbes.com, July 22, 2013, available at 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/dileeprao/2013/07/22/why-99-95-of-entrepreneurs-should-
stop-wasting-time-seeking-venture-capital/. 
43 These figures are likely to understate the rate of entrepreneurial failure for two 
reasons. First, at least some of the firms which had not exited with a zero value by the end 
of their data would have done so in the following years. Second, some of the ventures 
which exited with a positive value would have returned less than the amount invested in the 
startup, for an overall negative return. 
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pharmaceutical companies.  These companies are interesting because they 
invest in large numbers of discrete chemical compounds every year. It is 
therefore possible to track the success of these bets.44  In the United States, 
a chemical compound being investigated for possible medical use must 
undergo a series of tests before being approved.45 In Phase I, researchers 
test the compound in a small group of people for the first time to evaluate 
its safety, determine a safe dosage range, and identify side effects. In Phase 
 
 
Figure 3 Distribution of Venture Exit Value 
 
Source: Robert E. Hall and Susan E. Woodward, “The Burden of the Nondiversifiable 
Risk of Entrepreneurship,” American Economic Review, 100(3) 1163-1194. 
 
II, the compound is given to a larger group of people to see if it is effective 
and to further evaluate its safety. In Phase III, the compound is given to 
large groups of people to confirm its effectiveness, monitor side effects, 
compare it to commonly used treatments, and collect information that will 
allow it to be used safely. A drug can be rejected in any phase, and can only 
                                                
44 See Henry Grabowski, John Vernon and Joseph DiMasi (2002), “Returns for 1990s 
New Drug Introductions,” PharmacoEconomics, 20(3); Henry Grabowksi and John Vernon 
(1994), “Returns to R&D on new drug introductions in the 1980s,” Journal of Health 
Economics, 13. 
45 U.S. National Library of Medicine, “FAQ:  ClinicalTrials.gov – Clinical Trial 
Phases,” available at http://www.nlm.nih.gov/services/ctphases.html.  
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be approved for sale after passing Phase III. 46  One study tracking 
investigational compound success rates found only 71 percent of 
compounds that began phase I testing advanced to Phase II testing, only 
31.4 percent of those that began Phase I testing advanced to Phase III 
testing, and only 15.2 percent of those that began Phase I testing were 
approved for marketing.47  Another study found an even lower rate, with 
only 11 percent of chemicals beginning Phase I receiving approval.48 
Moreover, only a small fraction of new chemical compounds in which 
pharmaceutical companies invest research and development expenditures 
even make it to Phase I. 
Finally, economists have examined the economic value of patents 
beginning with the classic work by Ariel Pakes. 49   Companies and 
individuals spend money on research and development to generate ideas 
that they patent.  These studies find that few patents provide a significant 
return. Pakes’ 1986 study found that the median patent in France was 
valued at less than US$550 over its lifetime, and that the top 5 percent of 
patents accounted for more than 45 percent of total patent value. In the UK, 
the median patent was valued at just over US$1,500 over its lifetime and the 
top 5 percent of patents accounted for more than 35 percent of total value. 
In Germany, the median patent was valued at just over US$6,250 and the 
top 5 percent of patents accounted for over 30 percent of patent value. 
These results show that the returns to patents are highly skewed. 
Individuals and firms would not willingly assume the risks of investing 
                                                
46 After the drug has been marketed, it may be subject to phase IV, in which further 
studies are done to gather information on the drug’s effect in various populations and any 
side-effects associated with long-term use. U.S. National Library of Medicine, “FAQ:  
ClinicalTrials.gov – Clinical Trial Phases,” available at 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/services/ctphases.html. 
47 Joseph DiMasi, Ronald Hansen and Henry Grabowski (2003), “The Price of 
Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs,” Journal of Health Economics, 22 
at pp. 158, 162. 
48 Ismail Kola and John Landis (2004), “Can the Pharmaceutical Industry Reduce 
Attrition Rates,” Nature Reviews: Drug Discovery, 3, 711-715, at p. 712. 
49 Ariel Pakes (1986), “Patents as Options: Some Estimates of the Value of Holding 
European Patent Stocks,” Econometrica, 54(4) 755-784. See also Mark Schankerman and 
Ariel Pakes (1986), “Estimates of the Value of Patent Rights in European Countries During 
the Post-1950 Period,” Economic Journal, 96, 1052-1076, at pp. 1067-1068; Mark 
Schankerman (1998), “How Valuable Is Patent Protection? Estimates by Technology 
Field,” RAND Journal of Economics, 29(1), 77-107 at pp. 79, 93-94; Dietmar Harhoff, 
Francis Narin, F.M. Scherer, and Katrin Vopel (1999), “Citation Frequency and the Value 
of Patented Inventions,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 81(3), 511-515, at p. 512; 
Dietmar Harhoff, Frederic M. Scherer, and Katrin Vopel (2003), “Exploring the Tail of 
Patented Invention Value Distributions,” in Ove Granstrand (ed.), Economics, Law, and 
Intellectual Property: Seeking Strategies for Research and Teaching in a Developing Field, 
Boston: Klewer, 279-310, at p. 302. 
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in attempting to develop new products, services or technologies (or less 
costly means of providing existing products or services) if they believed 
that the prices they could charge for successful innovations would be 
subjected to artificial caps.   
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Percentiles and Lorenz Curve Coefficients from the 
Distribution of Realized Patent Values 
	   France	   United	  Kingdom	   Germany	  
Percentile	   Value	  (USD)	   Cumulative	  
Value	  Share	  
Value	  (USD)	   Cumulative	  
Value	  Share	  
Value	  (USD)	   Cumulative	  
Value	  Share	  
25th	  	   75.23	   0.544%	   355.55	   0.544%	   1,999.60	   2.249%	  
50th	  	   533.96	   1.833%	   1,516.84	   3.247%	   6,252.93	   7.341%	  
75th	  	   3,731.35	   8.087%	   7,947.55	   16.369%	   19,576.26	   25.288%	  
85th	  	   10,292.06	   19.575%	   15,357.09	   31.721%	   32,428.14	   41.001%	  
90th	  	   17,423.11	   31.261%	   22,206.21	   44.257%	   44,241.87	   52.672%	  
95th	  	   31,609.59	   52.461%	   34,740.07	   62.960%	   65,753.61	   69.223%	  
97th	  	   42,905.78	   65.514%	   43,889.95	   73.640%	   78,299.01	   78.348%	  
98th	  	   51,215.84	   73.729%	   51,277.22	   80.072%	   94,842.63	   83.800%	  
99th	  	   66,515.40	   84.011%	   65,075.08	   87.858%	   118,354.78	   90.330%	  
Maximum	   259,829.27	   -­‐	   374,028.70	   -­‐	   419,217.55	   -­‐	  
Mean	   5,631.03	   -­‐	   7,357.05	   -­‐	   16,169.48	   -­‐	  
Source: Ariel Pakes (1986), “Patents as Options: Some Estimates of the Value of Holding 
European Patent Stocks,” Econometrica, 54(4) 755-784. 
 
3. The Role of Rewards in Stimulating Investment and Effort at Innovation 
Investing time and effort in innovation is therefore a gamble. To be 
sure, those engaged in innovation are not literally playing a game of chance.  
Their odds of success increase if, through their efforts, they can come up 
with a clever idea that results in new technologies, products, or savings in 
deploying or making existing technologies or products.  Nevertheless, the 
analogy to a lottery helps explain the relationship between risk and reward.  
Consider a lottery in which people pay 1 Yuan for an entry. Only one 
person wins. If the lottery sells 10 million tickets then, in order for a person 
to have fair odds when they purchase a ticket, the reward must be 10 million 
Yuan.50  After the lottery selects a winner, 9,999,999 people will have spent 
a Yuan each with nothing in return. They have each lost 1 Yuan. One 
person wins 10 million Yuan and makes a profit of 9,999,999 Yuan after 
deducting the cost of the ticket. 
This lottery example shows the impact of imposing ex post rules on ex 
                                                
50 We assume that people are risk neutral. If they are risk averse the reward must be 
great and if they like risk the reward could be smaller. 
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ante investments. Suppose people were just willing to spend 1 Yuan per 
ticket for the lottery described above.  If the lottery reduced the payout to 
9,000,000 Yuan, economically rational and risk-neutral people would not 
buy a ticket. Likewise if the government imposed a special “excessive 
lottery tax” of 50 percent on lottery earnings they would not buy tickets 
either.  Any change in the amount of the reward has an impact on the 
willingness to participate in the lottery in the first place.  Ex post regulation 
of the winners of the contest has a chilling effect on the ex ante incentives 
of those considering the next contest. 
Human nature is no different in the case of investments in innovation.  
Entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, and companies all require the opportunity 
to earn an ex post reward sufficient to compensate them for the risk they 
bear ex ante.  Consider, for example, the entrepreneurs in the Hall-
Woodward study. On average these entrepreneurs probably did not recover 
the opportunity cost of their time.   Slightly more than 2 percent of the 
entrepreneurs received more than $100 million upon exit.   Suppose there 
was a special tax of 50 percent on earnings of $100 million or more from 
selling a startup. Ex post, that tax would have no effect since the 
entrepreneurs had already expended the effort. But if entrepreneurs expect 
that tax ex ante, then the overall returns to entrepreneurs would be reduced 
by approximately 43.5 percent since entrepreneurs with payouts of $100 
million or more accounted for 87 percent of the overall returns. 
4. The Innovation Process and Price Regulation 
The competitive process is built on rewards. Those rewards induce a 
massive amount of innovative effort by inventors, entrepreneurs, and firms. 
Investors often back those efforts with risk capital. Most everyone fails. 
They are quickly forgotten. Their efforts and the money behind them is all 
for nothing. A few succeed. They get the prize in the form of profits for 
their efforts. The public gets a prize too in the form of valuable new 
products and services that would not have existed but for these successful 
innovators. 
It is easy, after the fact, to question the wealth obtained by the 
successful innovator. Sometimes people argue that the innovator would still 
have made his contribution with a smaller reward. That is like saying that a 
lottery winner would have bought the ticket for an even smaller reward. The 
claim is obviously true if the lottery winner knew he would win. It ignores, 
however, the incentives needed to motivate participation in the lottery in the 
first place because of the highly uncertain outcome. No one knows when 
entering a lottery whether they will win. Similarly no one knows whether an 
innovation they are pursuing will succeed in the marketplace. In fact, 
innovation is a large numbers game. Only by having many try will success 
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emerge. 
Competition authorities and courts throughout the world have avoided 
regulating the prices that emerge from the competitive process because 
doing so reduces the very rewards that induce the massive innovative effort 
that drives economic progress and thereby benefits consumers. 
  
C.  Prices, Signals and the Competitive Process 
Modern economists and policymakers have come to recognize the 
critical role that prices play in guiding economies and promoting growth. 
The dynamic competitive process is highly decentralized.  Businesses, 
investors, and consumers make individual decisions.  These decisions are 
coordinated largely through the price system.  Prices help ration the use of 
scarce resources and the products made from these resources to those who 
value those resources and products most highly. They signal businesses and 
investors to enter or expand production in various industries.  More 
generally, they are the way in which knowledge about resource allocation 
issues gets diffused in society.51 
In principle it would be possible to collect information centrally and 
then make decisions on production and allocation based on that.  Many 
countries have attempted that approach to varying degrees at various points 
in their histories. The problem with that policy is that it seldom works in 
practice. The market relying on price signals has empirically proven to be 
capable of responding more nimbly and accurately to new information.  
Recognizing this, many market-oriented economies have reduced the role of 
price setting even further by virtually eliminating the small amount of price 
regulation that once existed. Most countries have dismantled large-scale 
price controls in the last two decades and have unleashed significant 
competition as a result. 
Chinese policy makers realized that a broad regulation of pricing would 
not help improve citizens’ living standards. They therefore initiated the 
gradual price reform process starting in 1979. The deregulation of prices 
accelerated following the adoption of the 1997 Price Law. By the end of 
2005, less than 5 percent of the retail sales value of consumption goods was 
subject to price regulation.52 This price liberalization has been a significant 
                                                
51 U.S. Federal Trade Commission and Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of 
Justice, “Excessive Prices,” in OECD Policy Roundtables: Excessive Prices (2011), 299-
308, available at: http://www.oecd.org/competition/abuse/49604207.pdf; for the classic 
discussion of this point see also F.A. Hayek (1945), “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” 
American Economic Review, 35 (4) 519-530. 
52 The percentage of market-determined prices was 95.6 percent as measured by 
consumption goods retail sales amounts, 91.9 percent as measured by raw materials sales 
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driver of the rapid growth of China’s economy and success of China’s 
transition to a market-oriented economy.53 The Plenary Session of the 
Communist Party recently affirmed this policy:54 
 
Perfect a mechanism where prices are determined by the market. Any 
price that can be affected by the market must be left to the market. Push 
ahead with price reforms of water, oil and natural gas, electricity, 
transportation and telecommunication. Areas in which the government 
sets prices will be confined to public utilities, public service and areas 
that are naturally monopolized.55 
 
The reluctance to regulate prices extends to competition authorities and 
courts. Summarizing the reactions of competition authorities to pursuing 
excessive pricing cases, the OECD noted:56  
 
More generally, the submissions for the Roundtable suggest that many 
competition authorities themselves harbour concerns with respect to 
aggressive competition law enforcement against excessive prices, 
premised on the belief that competition authorities are ill-equipped to 
function as price regulators: competition authorities seek to facilitate or 
preserve competition in the market, rather than dictate its terms. 
 
The EU, the United States, and most market-oriented countries have 
therefore adopted antitrust laws to make sure that firms do not interfere in 
the competitive process by colluding to fix prices or to exclude rivals. They 
                                                                                                                       
amounts, and 97.7 percent as measured by agricultural procurement amounts. See Wentong 
Zheng (2010), “Transplanting Antitrust in China: Economic Transition, Market Structure, 
and State Control,” University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Vol. 32, 
No.2. 
53 See Jean-Jacques Laffont and Claudia Senik-Leygonie (1997), Price Controls and 
the Economics of Institutions in China, Development Centre Studies, OECD Development 
Centre, Paris. 
54  See the Decision of the CCCPC on Some Major Issues Concerning 
Comprehensively Deepening the Reform, November 12, 2013, available at 
http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/2014-01/17/content_31226494.htm; see also the 
Communique of The Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the CPC, 
November 12, 2013, available at http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/2014-
01/16/content_31213800.htm.  
55 The regulation of telecommunication prices focuses on basic telecommunication 
services. With vibrant, fresh and dynamic market competition, the prices of mobile 
communication services have been well below the price caps set by the NDRC. 
56 OECD Secretariat, “Excessive Prices: Background Paper by the Secretariat,” in 
OECD Policy Roundtables: Excessive Pricing (2011), 9-196, available at:  
http://www.oecd.org/competition/abuse/49604207.pdf, at p. 10. 
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otherwise rely on the competitive process to determine prices, and other 
terms of trade, except in rare cases. They have done so explicitly, as we 
showed in the previous section, because they recognize that this approach 
will result in the greatest long-run welfare. 
 
D.  The Exceptional Circumstances Screen 
 In light of the concerns over competition policy regulating prices, 
jurisdictions with antitrust laws that prohibit excessive pricing by dominant 
firms have adopted various kinds of “exceptional circumstances” screens to 
narrow the situations in which they intervene to rare cases.  No matter the 
details of these tests, the practical result in all jurisdictions has been to 
allow the market to set prices for products, services and technologies and to 
limit the ability of dominant firms to set their own prices only in rare and 
extreme cases.  
1. An Overview of Exceptional Circumstances Screens 
 According to the OECD’s review the “most prominent screen is the 
need for high and non-transitory barriers to entry” such as laws that 
establish monopoly industries like the post office or public utilities in some 
countries.57 This criterion is substantially different than a firm having 
dominance in a market. Competition authorities generally do not pursue 
excessive pricing cases against dominant firms even though those firms 
often earn considerable profits. High and non-transitory barriers to entry 
involve circumstances in which one or a few entities are essentially entirely 
immune from any competition. That often entails the firm having a legal or 
regulated monopoly over a national industry. In these cases high prices 
cannot provide signals to induce investments in entry and innovation. 
Several economists have also proposed specific “exceptional 
circumstances” screens for excessive pricing.  Motta and de Streel 
proposed, as a starting point, a four-factor screen that was consistent with 
the European case law:58 
    
1) high and non-transitory barriers to entry leading to a monopoly or 
near monopoly; 
                                                
57 OECD Secretariat, “Excessive Prices: Background Paper by the Secretariat,” in 
OECD Policy Roundtables: Excessive Pricing (2011), 9-196, available at:  
http://www.oecd.org/competition/abuse/49604207.pdf, at 11. 
58 Massimo Motta and Alexandre de Streel (2007), “Excessive Pricing in Competition 
Law: Never say Never,” in Arvid Fredenberg and Niklas Strand (eds), The Pros and   Cons 
of High Prices, at p. 14. 
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2) this (near) monopoly being due to current or past exclusive or 
special rights; 
3) no effective means to eliminate the entry barriers; and, 
4) no sector regulator being competent to regulate the excessive prices. 
 
The authors then go on to limit intervention to cases in which competition 
authorities and courts are confident that the position was not the result of 
risky investment and innovation but was, instead, essentially bestowed on 
its holder by the government or happenstance. Moreover, the barriers 
contemplated by Motta and de Streel, and the degree of monopoly power 
bestowed by these barriers, go well beyond the ordinary notion of 
dominance. It must be close to super dominance, according to these 
authors.59They envision situations in which it is virtually impossible for 
entry to erode this super-dominant position. Then, even in the case in which 
a firm has close to a super-dominant position that was not the result of 
significant efforts on the part of the firm, Motta and de Streel would look 
for interventions to encourage entry before considering price regulation 
through antitrust. 
Evans and Padilla advocate a more restrictive screen:60  
 
1) The firm enjoys a (near) monopoly position in the market.  
2) The monopoly position is not the result of past investments or 
innovations. 
3) The monopoly position is protected by insurmountable legal barriers 
to entry. 
4) The prices charged by the firm widely exceed its average total costs 
inclusive of a return for risky investment. 
5) There is a risk that those prices may prevent the emergence of new 
goods and services in adjacent markets. 
 
Their reasoning is that using competition policy to regulate prices imposes a 
significant loss in dynamic efficiency and that excessive pricing cases 
should therefore be pursued only when the benefits are clear and significant. 
The new product prong of the test—which is similar to the European Court 
of Justice’s exceptional circumstances test for refusal to supply intellectual 
property—is designed to limit findings of excessive pricing to situations in 
which the prices deter the creation of a new market, which could be 
                                                
59 Id, p. 23. 
60 David S. Evans and Jorge Padilla (2005), “Excessive Prices: Using Economics to 
Define Administrable Legal Rules,” Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 1(1) 97-
122, at p. 119. 
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immensely valuable for society.61 
The details of the exceptional circumstances screen vary across 
jurisdictions, competition authorities, courts, and commentators. There 
appears to be a consensus, however, on the part of competition authorities 
that cases should be brought rarely and only in extreme situations.  There 
also appears to be a consensus among the courts that firms should be found 
to have engaged in an abuse of dominance as a result of charging a high 
price only in very limited situations.  There is considerable support for the 
view that antitrust law should not prevent firms in innovation-intensive 
industries from profiting from their risky investments except in the most 
extreme circumstances, and perhaps never.  
2. Exceptional Circumstances Screen and Intellectual Property  
That conclusion applies in particular to industries involving intellectual 
property such as patents and copyrights. The marginal cost of selling or 
licensing intellectual property is often small, and in the case of electronic 
distribution, essentially negligible.62 Yet it costs something—perhaps quite 
a bit—to invent.  Creating intellectual property to make money is a gamble. 
Out of all that are created, only a few books, songs, movies, video games, 
and patents are successful. The top 20 percent of movies earn 80-85 percent 
of box-office revenue,63 and more than 70 percent of movies generate 
negative returns at the box office.64 At online bookstores, the top 5 percent 
of titles account for more than 60 percent of sales, and the distribution is 
even more skewed at bricks-and-mortar bookstores.65 For music albums, the 
                                                
61 Also see Amelia Fletcher and Alina Jardine (2007), “Toward an Appropriate Policy 
for Excessive Pricing,” in Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Mel Marquis (eds.), European 
Competition Law Annual 2007: A Reformed Approach to Article 82 EC, at pp. 4-5; Lars-
Hendrik Roller (2007), “Exploitative Abuses,” in Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Mel 
Marquis (eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2007: A Reformed Approach to Article 
82 EC, at pp. 2-3; Bruce Lyons (2007), “The Paradox of the Exclusion of Exploitative 
Abuse,” in Arvid Fredenberg and Niklas Strand (eds), The Pros and  Cons of High Prices, 
at pp. 74-75. 
62 For example, it used to cost a modest amount to stamp out a CD to distribute music 
or software; now is essentially costless to make music and software downloadable over the 
Internet. 
63 Alan Collins, Chris Hand, and Martin C. Snell (2002), “What Makes a Blockbuster? 
Economic Analysis of Film Success in the United Kingdom,” Managerial and Decision 
Economics, 23(6) 343-354; Arthur De Vany and W. David Walls (1996). “Bose-Einstein 
Dynamics and Adaptive Contracting in the Motion Picture Industry,” Economic Journal, 
106(439) 1493-1514. 
64 W. David Walls (2010), “General Stable Models of the Rate of Return to Hollywood 
Films,” Advances and Applications in Statistical Sciences, 2(1) 19-36. 
65 Erik Brynjolfsson, Michael D. Smith, and Yu (Jeffrey) Hu (2003), “Consumer 
Surplus in the Digital Economy: Estimating the Value of Increased Product Variety at 
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first year sales of an album at the 90th percentile is more than ten times the 
first year sales of the median album.66 The top 5 percent of patents account 
for 30 to 47 percent of total patent value.67 These businesses therefore 
follow the economics of lotteries discussed earlier.  Since most entries lose 
the few that win must receive ample rewards. 
Competition authorities and courts have found excessive pricing 
involving holders of intellectual property rights very infrequently.68 Indeed, 
several commentators have concluded correctly that the concept of 
excessive pricing is antithetical to the purpose of intellectual property 
rights, which are granted expressly under the laws of many countries for the 
purpose of providing firms and individuals with rewards for making risky 
investments in creativity. For example, Motta and de Streel conclude “any 
good or service protected by Intellectual Property Rights should in principle 
not be subject to an excessive prices action.”69  Likewise Fletcher and 
Jardin conclude “There should be no intervention under Article 82 against 
the high prices of an innovative product within its patent period.” 70  
                                                                                                                       
Online Booksellers,” Management Science, 49(11) 1580-1596; Judith Chevalier and 
Austan Goolsbee (2003), “Measuring Prices and Price Competition Online: Amazon.com 
and barnesandnoble.com,” Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 1(2), 203-222. 
66 Ken Hendricks and Alan Sorensen (2009), “Information and the Skewness of Music 
Sales,” Journal of Political Economy, 117(2) 324-369. 
67 Ariel Pakes (1986), “Patents as Options: Some Estimates of the Value of Holding 
European Patent Stocks,” Econometrica, 54(4) 755-784. 
68 The main exception to this statement concerns excessive pricing cases involving 
music collecting societies. In some cases domestic legislation authorizes a single society to 
administer copyright licenses on behalf of music writers and publishers while in other cases 
a natural monopoly emerges. Music collecting societies are horizontal combinations of 
music writers and publishers. Unless authorized by law these combinations can function 
only with an exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU. In most countries there is a single 
music collecting society that represents all of the music writers and publishers.  They are 
therefore industry-wide monopolies in most countries. See, for example, Ernst-Joachim 
Mestmäcker (2006) “Collecting Societies,” in Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Isabela 
Atanasiu (eds.), The Interaction between Competition Law and Intellectual Property Law, 
Hart Publishing.  The competition authorities and courts have heard a number of claims 
that these national music-collecting societies have charged excessive prices.    
69 Massimo Motta and Alexandre de Streel (2007), “Excessive Pricing in Competition 
Law: Never say Never,” in Arvid Fredenberg and Niklas Strand (eds), The Pros and   Cons 
of High Prices, at p. 26.   
70 Amelia Fletcher and Alina Jardin (2007), “Towards an Appropriate Policy for 
Excessive Pricing,” Working Paper presented at the 12th Annual Competition Law and 
Policy Workshop, available at 
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/Competition/2007%28pdf%29/200709-COMPed-
Fletcher-Jardine.pdf. In discussing the problems with excessive pricing intervention they 
note that, “Intellectual property rights are specifically designed to provide innovating firms 
with a degree of market power, and to stimulate upfront R&D investment through the 
‘prize’ of higher than normal future profits. Any reduction in future profits—or a greater 
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Consistent with this view, as we discuss below, Article 55 of China’s AML 
exempts intellectual property rights from antitrust scrutiny except to the 
extent that they are abused in order “to eliminate or restrict market 
competition”. 
Quite unlike legal monopolies over industries there is significant 
competition for creating patents and copyrights. Nothing prevents firms 
from entering that race. That situation is unlike state-owned enterprises, for 
which competition is barred, and previously state-owned companies that are 
the beneficiaries to prior entry barriers together with significant network 
effects. Moreover, there is often competition among patents and copyrights. 
There are often numerous ways of creating products using alternative 
patents. And consumers can substitute between different music, books, 
videogames, and movies even though each is subject to a copyright.  
That point is also true for Standard Essential Patents (SEPs). An SEP 
covers a technology that a Standard Setting Organization (SSO) has 
incorporated in a standard. One could argue whether competition authorities 
or courts should ever define an antitrust market that consists of an SEP 
given the static and dynamic competition among standards. But regardless 
of market definition SEPs do not establish permanent barriers to entry into 
an industry like a postal monopoly would. At any point in time different 
standards compete with each other. Over time innovation and entry displace 
standards. For example, in mobile communications technologies having an 
SEP on 2G does not protect the holder from competition from 3G; and 
having an SEP on 3G does not protect the holder from 4G competition. 
Further, standards are updated and modified on a continuing basis.  Owning 
an SEP on 3G today does not mean that a company will own an SEP on a 
future version of 3G since a newer, better, or less costly technology may 
replace the company’s technology.  Firms compete to get their technologies 
incorporated into standards. The fact that certain of their technologies have 
been adopted for one standard does not mean that any of their technologies 
will be adopted for subsequent standards. 
There is another reason for competition authorities and courts to abstain 
from regulating the prices for intellectual property. Economics provides 
some guidance for regulating industries in which there is a close 
relationship between prices and the cost of production. For example, 
regulators of basic telecommunications services can rely on elaborate 
models that show the prices that telecommunication providers need to 
receive to compensate them for costs and a competitive rate of return.   
There is no such guidance for intellectual property. On the one hand, it 
is a virtually impossible task for economists, or for competition authorities 
                                                                                                                       
risk of these profits being regulated—could clearly jeopardize such incentives.” 
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and courts, to determine how much reward innovators should receive to 
promote the right amount of innovation. The competitive process, on the 
other hand, does this well. The few successful innovators get rewards. 
Those rewards induce more innovators to try and more entry to occur. This 
reinforcing process of innovation and reward is the engine behind economic 
progress. 
IV. THE ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING WHETHER AN UNFAIR 
PRICING ABUSE HAS OCCURRED 
Competition authorities and courts have used the exceptional 
circumstances test to winnow the situations in which they consider whether 
a dominant firm has committed an unfair pricing abuse.  For the rare cases 
they do consider, competition authorities and courts must then assess 
whether the dominant firm under consideration has, in fact, engaged in 
unfair pricing. This section considers the economics of analyzing whether a 
dominant firm has engaged in an excessive pricing abuse in the exceptional 
circumstances in which competition authorities and courts consider such 
abuses at all. 
Competition authorities and courts around the world have largely 
rejected the simple static model in which any price that exceeds cost is 
deemed too high. The European Court of Justice has put forward the most 
influential economic approach for assessing unfair pricing claims. This 
approach is widely used of course by competition authorities and national 
courts in the European Union.  Courts and competition authorities in other 
countries such as Israel and Turkey have also adopted this approach, and 
other countries such as South Africa have been influenced by it.71 
The European Court of Justice in United Brands developed a two-prong 
economic test for whether the prices charged by a dominant firm are 
excessive:72  
 
                                                
71 Israel Antitrust Authority (2011), “Excessive Prices,” in European Commission, 
“Article 102 and Excessive Prices,” in OECD Policy Roundtables: Excessive Prices, 
available at: http://www.oecd.org/competition/abuse/49604207.pdf, at p. 261; Turkish 
Competition Authority (2011), “Excessive Prices,” in European Commission, “Article 102 
and Excessive Prices,” in OECD Policy Roundtables: Excessive Prices, available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/competition/abuse/49604207.pdf, at p. 281; Mittal Steel South Africa 
Ltd & Macsteel International BV and Macsteel Holdings (pty) Ltd vs. Harmony Gold 
Mining Company Ltd and Durban Rooderpoort Deep Ltd, Case No. 70/CAC/Apr07, 
available at http://www.comptrib.co.za/assets/Uploads/Case-Documents/70CACApr07.pdf.  
72  Case 27/76, United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v. 
Commission of the European Communities, 1978 E.C.R. 207. The Court said there could be 
other ways to determine excessive pricing and therefore did not exclude the possibility that 
other tests could be employed. 
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The questions therefore to be determined are whether the difference between 
the costs actually incurred and the price actually charged is excessive, and, if 
the answer to this question is in the affirmative, whether a price has been 
imposed which is either unfair in itself or when compared to competing 
products.  
 
The first prong is based on a “price-cost” test that essentially determines 
whether the dominant firm is marking its prices up over cost too much and 
thereby earning significant profits.  The second prong is based on the 
“value” of the product or service to buyers, as we will explain below. 
The European Court of Justice and other courts have observed that this 
test faces significant empirical and evidentiary challenges in practice.  In 
fact, the European Court of Justice and national courts have often found that 
competition authorities have failed to meet their burden of proof that either 
prong is satisfied.  These difficulties are most severe in innovation-intensive 
industries. 
A.   Price-Cost Test 
The price-cost prong of the Court’s test would be straightforward if 
markets worked like the textbook model that underlies Figure 1.  Under 
perfect competition firms should charge prices equal to marginal cost. Any 
price significantly greater than marginal cost is therefore “excessive”. Of 
course the textbook model is based on very special assumptions and applies 
in fact to few, if any, real-world markets.  Moreover, if competition 
authorities and courts applied the textbook model they would find that 
prices exceed marginal cost for most firms in most industries regardless of 
whether the firms are dominant within the meaning of competition policy.  
Practical approaches try to introduce real-world considerations into the 
price-cost comparisons to make them more accurate.  The extent to which 
this can be done in practice varies across industries and is most difficult in 
innovation-intensive ones. 
1. Comparing Prices and Costs to Determine Excessive Pricing 
The first difficulty with a straightforward comparison of price to 
marginal cost is that most firms incur fixed costs of operation. In the long 
run firms must be able to recover these fixed costs to remain in business and 
they must expect to be able to recover these fixed costs to enter a business.  
A price equal to marginal cost will not enable firms to recover these fixed 
costs. Consider a simple firm that has annual fixed costs of 10 million Yuan 
and marginal costs of 10 Yuan a unit. If it only charged 10 Yuan a unit it 
would not make enough profit to cover the 10 million Yuan fixed cost. One 
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way to address this issue in practice is to calculate the margin based on the 
difference between price and average total cost or to calculate the economic 
profits (the difference between total revenue and total economic costs) 
instead of margins. 
The second issue concerns measuring the competitive rate of return. To 
attract capital, firms must secure at least a normal rate of return.  In practice, 
most firms face varying degrees of risk in entering industries and in 
competing against known and unknown rivals.  These firms and their 
investors need to be compensated for that risk.  The degree of risk varies 
widely across firms and industries. Risk is greatest for inventing and then 
marketing completely new technologies and products.  Risk is smallest for 
mature industries with routine production and well-developed business 
models. For example, a survey of the cost of capital for broad US industries 
shows that the cost of capital for a relatively high-risk industry such as 
semi-conductor equipment was about 2.5 times the cost of capital for a low-
risk industry such as electric utilities.73  
The third and related issue is that a significant portion of the economy 
consists of businesses that are based almost entirely on intellectual property 
such as software, music, and patent licensing.  The IP-based firms have low 
marginal costs of production and high fixed costs. Accounting for fixed 
costs is therefore important for them. More importantly, firms in IP-based 
industries encounter significant risk since the preponderance of creative 
efforts ultimately fail for all intents and purposes. 
The fourth issue is that the price-cost relationship is not necessarily a 
meaningful indicator of excessive pricing for a considerable part of the 
economy.  A large portion of modern economies consists of multi-sided 
platforms that serve multiple distinct groups of customers.74 Economists 
have shown as a matter of theory and empirical fact that to coordinate the 
demands on the multiple sides of the platforms these firms may charge one 
customer group prices lower than marginal cost and other customers prices 
higher than marginal costs.75 Newspapers, for example, often charge readers 
less than the marginal cost of printing and distributing the newspaper and 
charge advertisers more than the marginal cost of inserting ads.  Many 
                                                
73 Aswath Damodaran (NYU Stern), “Cost of Capital by Sector,” (January 2014), 
available at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/wacc.htm. 
74 David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee, “The Antitrust Analysis of Multisided 
Platform Businesses,” in Roger Blair and Daniel Sokol (eds.), Oxford Handbook on 
International Antitrust Economics (forthcoming); David S. Evans (2013), “The Consensus 
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75 Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole (2006), “Two-Sided Markets: A Progress 
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“Competition in Two-Sided Markets,” RAND Journal of Economics, 37(3) 668-691. 
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Internet platforms provide services free to individuals and make all of their 
money from advertising.76  For platforms, margin analysis must take into 
account the prices and costs for all customer groups for the platform and 
should not consider just one. 
In principle economics can address each of these issues by incorporating 
fixed costs, risk, and multi-sided pricing into the analysis. In practice, data 
limitations make this difficult. Courts have often rejected cases brought by 
competition authorities because of their failure to produce reliable evidence 
of price-cost differences.  That was the case, for example, with the United 
Brands case in the European Union, the Attheraces case in the United 
Kingdom, and the Mittal case in South Africa.77 
The issues we have described are most severe in innovation-intensive 
industries. These industries typically involve significant fixed-cost 
investments and high degrees of risk.  That is particularly true for industries 
in which intellectual property rights are important. Moreover, many modern 
innovation-intensive industries, particularly those involving information 
communications and technology, involve multi-sided platforms.    
2. Risk Adjusted Profits 
The price-cost comparison discussed above is a rudimentary attempt at 
assessing whether a firm is charging more than the competitive level. A 
more sophisticated approach, though still problematic, involves examining 
whether a firm is earning a supra-competitive profit on its investments after 
accounting for risk.  For a company as a whole, a common approach for 
measuring the profitability of investments is to compare the return on 
capital to the cost of capital.  A firm makes an “above-normal” profit if the 
return on capital exceeds the cost of capital after adjusting for risk.  
However, this approach encounters several issues. 
First, in measuring the return on capital economists have found that the 
typical accounting approaches for doing this—while perfectly suitable for 
the usual accounting and corporate governance purposes for which they are 
used—do not provide accurate or consistent measures of the economic rate 
of return that could be used for comparing different companies or against a 
                                                
76 David Evans (2013), “Attention Rivalry among Online Platforms”, Electronics 
Intellectual Property, MIIT China, vol. 9, 30-41(in Chinese). 
77 Case 27/76, United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v. 
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competitive benchmark.  A key issue is that accounting methods for 
depreciating research and development, advertising, and other investments 
with future payoffs can lead to significant biases in the rate of return.  
Economists have proposed a number of methods for dealing with these 
problems.78 
Second, in assessing whether the firm is earning supra-competitive 
profits it is in fact not correct as a matter of economics to compare the rate 
of return to the cost of capital for the reasons we discussed earlier.  Ex post 
successful firms will necessarily have rates of return on capital that exceed 
their risk-adjusted cost of capital.  Unsuccessful firms will necessarily have 
rates of return on capital that are below their risk-adjusted cost of capital 
and often will have no return on capital at all. 
Consider a competition to develop a new technology for gene splicing. 
There are 100 firms. Each invests 1 million Yuan a year over 10 years to 
develop the technology. Each firm therefore invests 10 million Yuan. 
Together over 10 years they have invested 1 billion Yuan.  Only 1 firm 
succeeds.  Thus, there is a 99 percent chance of failure and a 1 percent 
chance of success. 
Let us suppose that to bear the risk—that there is a 99 percent chance of 
losing 10 million Yuan and a 1 percent chance of winning—each firm 
would need to expect at the beginning that they would earn 15 million Yuan 
or a 50 percent rate of return.  In other words they would need to believe 
that they have a 1 percent chance of winning 15 million Yuan. The cost of 
capital is 50 percent since that is the minimum return that covers the risk. 
To participate in this technology contest, each firm must believe that the 
winner will earn 1.5 billion Yuan.  That is, in order to have a 1 percent 
chance of winning 15 million Yuan, the prize must be 100 times 15 million 
or 1.5 billion Yuan. That 1.5 billion Yuan is therefore the minimum prize 
necessary for inducing these 100 firms to try. 
Now consider the winner. Suppose the winner has earnings of exactly 
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1.5 billion Yuan.  It incurred investment costs of 10 million Yuan. Its return 
is 150 times its investment and its rate of return is 15,000 percent.  That is 
much higher than its cost of capital of 50 percent.  Yet this is the 
competitive outcome.  There is no excessive profit since if the winner 
earned less than 1.5 billion Yuan, none of the firms, if acting rationally, 
would have entered the race in this example. Accordingly, if firms knew in 
advance that authorities would apply excessive pricing laws to cap their 
profits below that level, no technology would have been created. Moreover, 
even if firms believed there was a possibility of such a ruling, that risk and 
uncertainty would discourage investment.79 
There is some information available to assess whether very high profits 
are truly greater than the returns necessary to attract risky effort and capital. 
Some venture capital lore indicates that VCs in the U.S. typically seek a 5 
to 10 times return on their investment.  That is, when they consider making 
an investment, they examine whether, if it is successful, they will be able to 
increase their investment 5 to 10 times.80  They do not expect that each 
investment will return this amount. Rather, they insist on this upside to their 
investment because they recognize that most of their investments will return 
little if nothing. 
Some companies approve investments in new initiatives only if there is 
a business case that they will recoup their investment in 3-7 years.81  That 
implies a significant rate of return. They require this because they are 
accounting for the fact that many of the investments they make will not 
work out.   
In all these cases the “successful investments” appear to have high rates 
of return. For example, the compound annual rate of return on a $10 million 
VC investment in year 1 that yields a payout of $100 million in year 10 is 
nearly 26 percent a year.  That is more than eight times higher than a risk 
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80 Dermot Berkery (2008), Raising Venture Capital for the Serious Entrepreneur, at p. 
23, 70 (“the entrepreneur needs to convince the investors … the opportunity is big enough 
for early investors to get a 10 to 20 times multiple return on their investment.” .. “While 
investors might be hoping for a 10 to 20 times multiple on an exit, they will not complain 
with a 3 to 5 times multiple.”). 
81 Susanne Espenlaub, Arif Khurshed and Abdulkadir Mohamed (2010) “The Exit 
Behavior of Venture Capital Firms,” Working Paper, at p. 36. 
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free rate of return such as the 10-year US Treasury note (currently with an 
annual yield around 3 percent), which is a good proxy for the competitive 
rate of return for a perfectly competitive company that faces no risk.  
However, that 26 percent rate of return is not excessive because it was 
necessary in order to induce the venture capitalist to make investments in 
the many other ventures that failed.82 
To determine whether a firm has a rate of return that exceeds the 
competitive level after accounting for risk involves two major steps. The 
first step involves determining the rate of return that the firm has obtained 
for investments in the product in question.  That involves collecting data on 
the time pattern of investments and returns and dealing with the economic 
biases resulting from the treatment of R&D, advertising, and other 
investments.  If the firm has a rate of return that is less than its risk-adjusted 
cost of capital (50 percent in the example above) then it is clear that its 
return on capital has not even compensated it for the risk it occurred. 
However, if a firm has a rate of return on capital that exceeds its cost of 
capital that does not imply that its returns are excessive for the reasons we 
have just discussed. In the context of an innovation race, the second step 
needs to determine whether the winners of the race have earned more than 
the minimum prize that the participants in the race required to enter the race 
in the first place. 
As a practical matter, completing the second step of this analysis, and 
possibly even the first step, is likely to be quite difficult.  That is the main 
reason that assessing excessive pricing in innovation-intensive industries is 
very difficult to conduct with any degree of reliability. 
 
 
B.  Economic Value and Unfair Prices 
The second prong of the United Brands test is whether the price is 
“unfair.” A number of courts, authorities, and commentators have 
concluded that the Court intended the second prong of the test to account 
                                                
82 Yet between 1987 and 2000 venture capitalists in the United States only had an 
annual return of 15 percent, which was slightly lower than the S&P 500 annual return of 
15.9% over this same period. John Cochrane (2005) “The Risk and Return of Venture 
Capital” Journal of Financial Economics, 75(1) 3-52, at pp. 17-19.  The explanation for 
the difference is straightforward.  The high return on the occasional successful businesses 
compensates for the low returns on the many unsuccessful ones. Conceptually, this is the 
same as the lottery. The high earnings for the winner offset the lack of winnings for the 
vast number of unsuccessful ticket purchasers. 
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for the value of the product to the buyer.83 The European Court of Justice 
stated that a firm in a dominant position would commit an excessive pricing 
abuse if the price it charged bore “no reasonable relation to the economic 
value of the product.”  One way to assess economic value is the cost of 
producing the product.  That forms the first prong of the test. The other way 
to assess economic value is to the buyer. That, according to the European 
Commission in Scandlines and the UK Court of Appeal in Attheraces, is the 
purpose of the second prong. 
Scandlines complained that the Port of Helsingborg was charging an 
excessive price. The Commission concluded that  
 
even if it were to be assumed that there is a positive difference between 
the price and the production costs exceeding what Scandlines claims as 
being a reasonable margin (whatever that may be), the conclusion 
should not necessarily be drawn that the price is unfair, provided that 
this price has a reasonable relation to the economic value of the 
product/service supplied. The assessment of the reasonable relation 
between the price and the economic value of the product/service must 
also take into account the relative weight of non-cost related factors. 
 
Attheraces complained that the British Horseracing Board (BHB) 
charged it excessive prices for certain horse racing information. BHB 
argued the “economic value of a product … reflects the ‘revenue-earning 
potential to the person who acquires it’.”  The Court insisted that the price 
would have to be sufficiently high to interfere with the ability of Attheraces 
to compete.84   
 
We appreciate that this theoretical answer leaves the possibility of a 
monopoly supplier not quite killing the goose that lays the golden eggs, 
but coming close to throttling her. We do not exclude the possibility that 
this could be held to be abuse, not least because of its potential impact 
on the consumer. But Article 82 … is not a general provision for the 
regulation of prices. It seeks to prevent the abuse of dominant market 
positions with the object of protecting and promoting competition. The 
evidence and findings here do not show [Attheraces’s] competitiveness 
                                                
83 Case COMP/A.36.750/D3, Scandlines Sverige AB v. Port of Helsingborg [2006] 4 
CMLR 23; Nihls Wahl, “Exploitative High Prices and European Competition Law - A 
Personal Reflection,” in “The Pros and Cons of High Prices,” Swedish Competition 
Authority (Sweden: Lenanders Grafiska, 2007); Attheraces Ltd. v. British Horseracing 
Board Ltd., [2007] EWCA (Civ) 38, [2007] UKCLR (CA) 309. 
84 Attheraces Ltd. v. British Horseracing Board Ltd., [2007] EWCA (Civ) 38, [2007] 
UKCLR (CA) 309. 
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to have been, or to be at risk of being, materially compromised…. 
   
The Court found that, even if BHB took 50 percent of the profit that 
Attheraces earned from using BHB’s information in the downstream 
market, BHB’s price would not necessarily be unfair. The Court insisted 
that it would want further evidence that the price distorted competition in 
the downstream market. 
These approaches do not lead to a bright-line economic test for the 
second prong.  They do, however, suggest three screens for assessing 
excessive pricing claims that courts and competition authorities could use.  
These screens can be used to identify situations in which there is little 
reason to believe that prices are unfair and therefore help competition 
authorities and courts eliminate cases at an earlier stage, before having to 
reach the much more difficult inquiry concerning whether the situation 
involves one of the rare circumstances in which a price should be regulated 
under the antitrust law.  
1. Significant Value Screen 
The first screen is whether the buyer is obtaining a significant value 
from purchasing the product. In economic terms the surplus for the buyer is 
the difference between the most the buyer is willing to pay for a product 
(the buyer’s willingness to pay) and the price the buyer actually does pay 
for a product.  If a buyer were willing to pay 1000 Yuan for a product but 
only had to pay 700 Yuan, then the buyer has surplus of 300. There is no 
objective measure of “significant value” but one could argue that the price 
becomes less fair when it leaves little surplus for the buyer.  The advantage 
of the significant value screen is that it ensures that the seller captures a 
significant portion of the surplus of the product as profit thereby providing 
an incentive for making risky investments while leaving something left over 
for the buyer. The court or competition authority would find unfair pricing 
only if the buyer is not receiving some meaningful value after paying for the 
product. 
Several sources of empirical evidence can help assess whether the buyer 
is receiving significant value over and above the price it is paying. In the 
case of consumers it is possible to estimate their demand schedule, which 
incorporates their willingness to pay, from consumer surveys or from 
econometric estimates based on observed data over time or across 
geographic markets.  In the case of businesses, it may be possible to assess 
the additional profit that the buyer earns from the input. The final type of 
evidence is the comparative evidence, discussed below, which can be used 
to determine how willing buyers and sellers ordinarily split the gains from 
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trade. The fact that other buyers have paid the price sought by the seller also 
confirms the value of the product. 
One drawback of the significant value screen involves situations in 
which the buyer and seller cannot reach terms. In all markets, including 
highly competitive ones, some consumers decide they do not want to pay 
for a product.  In a business-to-business market a business buyer may 
decide that an input costs too much because it cannot make enough profit at 
that cost. That may be because the buyer is not as efficient as other 
producers or for many other reasons. Therefore, while the significant value 
screen is useful for identifying cases in which the price is not excessive 
within the meaning of the unfair pricing law, it is not necessarily useful for 
identifying cases in which the price is unfair. 
2. The Harm to Competition Screen 
The second screen is whether the seller’s price results in harm to 
competition in the same or a downstream market as a result of excluding 
rivals and thereby raising prices. There are some situations, for example, in 
which upstream firms may have incentives to extend their market power 
from an upstream market to a downstream market. 85  In these cases 
excessive prices could be part of an exploitative strategy, such as a margin 
squeeze 86  or a constructive refusal to deal, 87  designed to eliminate 
downstream competition. There could also be some situations in which an 
upstream firm may have an incentive to limit the emergence of downstream 
competitors because they could evolve into upstream competitors. Of 
course, these anticompetitive effects are only possibilities. Upstream firms 
have strong incentives to encourage competition in the downstream market. 
By encouraging lower overall prices and sales they can increase the size of 
the market for the input they supply.   
The advantage of this second screen is that it limits excessive 
pricing cases to those in which there is a potentially significant economic 
benefit from limiting behavior that harms competition and destroys 
significant value for consumers. For example, excessive prices could be 
used to prevent the emergence of a new product which, as Evans and 
Padilla argue, could be one of the exceptional circumstances that could 
                                                
85 Dennis W. Carlton and Jeffrey M. Perloff (2005), Modern Industrial Organization, 
4th edition, at 406-411; Massimo Motta (2004), Competition Policy: Theory and Practice, at 
347-377. 
86 See Zhiguo Li (2009), “Margin Squeeze in Telecom Industry: New Trend in 
Determining Margin Squeeze in EU’s Telecom Industry,” China Telecommunication 
Trade, Vol. 12. 
87 See Yanbei Meng (2008), “Analyze the Issue of Refusal to Deal in Tying Conduct: 
the Kodak (1992) Case,” Journal of Renmin University of China, vol. 6. 
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warrant intervention over excessive prices.88 
Without this screen, excessive pricing cases may merely result in the 
transfer of wealth between a buyer and a seller.  Scandlines and Attheraces 
were simply looking for better prices for themselves.  Ruling for them 
would have mainly increased their profits at the expense of their sellers 
without necessarily increasing consumer welfare. 
There are well-developed methods in competition policy for 
examining whether these possible anticompetitive effects are likely to occur 
and outweigh any pro-competitive benefits.89 Applying this screen brings 
excessive pricing into the mainstream of antitrust by focusing on those well-
understood cases in which business practices have the potential of harming 
the competitive process.  
3. The Normal Price Screen 
The “normal price screen” considers whether the seller is charging the 
buyer a price that is similar to the price that it is charging other buyers, or 
prices that similar companies are charging other buyers for similar goods or 
services.90  If many businesses are able to compete at the price being 
charged by the firm that is the subject of the unfair pricing inquiry for its 
input, then that suggests the input price is not interfering with competition 
and reflects the value of the product.  These price comparisons are therefore 
useful for identifying situations in which a firm’s price is not unfair under 
the second prong of the tests. 
The similarity requirement is critical. In the real world, companies sell 
products that are differentiated from each other. They try to do so in part to 
appeal to particular groups of customers that might prefer that particular 
combination. Consequently, the fact that a seller charges a higher price to 
one buyer than another is not sufficient evidence of unfair pricing.  As a 
practical matter, it is difficult to compare prices across producers because 
there are many differences that need to be considered, including differences 
in the products and, even when the products are similar, differences in the 
buyers.  These difficulties are compounded in considering the price for a 
technology in an innovation-intensive industry where alternative 
technologies may provide fewer benefits to the consumer, require higher 
                                                
88 See Evans and Padilla (2005), op. cit. 
89 See European Commission (2009), “Guidance on the Commission's enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by 
dominant undertakings” Official Journal of the European Union; Office of Fair Trading 
(2004), “Assessment of market power: Understanding competition law” Competition Law 
Guideline. 
90 In the next section we will see that the NDRC has adopted a version of the normal 
price screen as part of its guidelines for assessing unfair pricing abuses. 
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costs of implementation by the manufacturer, or involve higher transactions 
costs in negotiating.   
The courts that have suggested the possible use of price comparisons 
have themselves recognized the difficulty in applying them in practice.  
Those courts generally have not found excessive pricing based on simple 
price comparisons. For example, in United Brands the European Court of 
Justice did not find it persuasive by itself that United Brands charged less 
for bananas in Ireland than elsewhere.91 It is also important to note that it is 
routine business practice in a competitive market for commercial terms that 
a company negotiates with customers to differ significantly across 
customers for legitimate pro-competitive reasons.92    
  
C.   The Error Cost Framework and Excessive Prices 
Courts and competition authorities have taken an extremely cautious 
approach towards pursuing excessive pricing cases. The error cost 
framework helps explain why. 93  Suppose that courts and competition 
authorities could calculate exactly the benefits of lower prices today and the 
costs of discouraging risky investment in innovation over time from 
reducing rewards. Then it would increase economic welfare if the net 
benefits of pursuing excessive pricing cases exceeded the administrative 
costs of doing so. 
As we have seen in this section, however, the courts and competition 
authorities have struggled to develop a sound definition of excessive 
pricing. They have also recognized that the various measures that could be 
considered for determining whether prices are excessive are quite difficult 
to implement accurately in practice. At the same time it is difficult to 
forecast the impact of forcing successful firms to charge lower prices on the 
incentives to make risky investments and therefore on the pace of 
innovation and economic progress. 
In any particular case, courts and competition authorities could make 
two kinds of mistakes. They could find that a price is excessive even though 
the harm to long-run innovation outweighs the long-run benefits of 
                                                
91  Case 27/76, United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v. 
Commission of the European Communities, 1978 E.C.R. 207, at 241-242. 
92 It is well known that it is common in competitive markets to have price differences 
across customers. William J. Baumol and Daniel G. Swanson (2003), “The New Economy 
and Ubiquitous Competitive Price Discrimination: Identifying Defensible Criteria of 
Market Power,” Antitrust Law Journal, 70(3) 661-685. 
93 Frank H. Easterbrook (1984), “The Limits of Antitrust”, Tex. L. Rev. 63(1); Steven 
C. Salop & Craig R. Romaine (1999), “Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal 
Standards, and Microsoft”, Geo. Mason L. Rev. 7 at pp. 617, 659. 
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lowering it. That is known as a “false positive” test result.  Alternatively, 
they could find that a price is not excessive even though the benefits of 
lowering it would exceed the harm to long-run innovation. That is known as 
a “false negative” test result.   
 These mistakes are unlikely to balance out. The cost of a false positive 
can be quite significant. The reduced incentives to innovation could reduce 
the flow of new innovative technologies, new products and cost-savings 
innovations.  Those innovations generate significant value as we saw 
earlier.  The cost of a false negative is twofold. It causes some deadweight 
loss as a result of the dominant firm restricting output. And it causes a 
transfer of surplus from consumers to the dominant firm. In business-to-
business transactions that transfer is from one producer to other producers. 
The cost to society of false positives is almost certainly far greater than 
the cost to society of false negatives in innovation-intensive industries.  
False positives can prevent the emergence of new products and new 
technologies that support many new products. As we explained earlier, the 
value of these new products and technology to society is vast.  False 
negatives result in some deadweight losses from underproduction; but such 
losses are much smaller than the losses from the suppression of new 
products and technologies as we discussed earlier.     
It is difficult as a practical matter to put numbers on the magnitude of 
the costs imposed by these false positives and false negatives and the 
likelihood of their occurring under various alternative implementations of 
the excessive pricing test. However, courts and competition authorities that 
have considered this issue have generally reached two conclusions. The first 
is that they should find excessive pricing rarely because of the possible 
harm to innovation and economic progress. Their decision to seldom pursue 
excessive pricing cases is consistent with their having concluded that the 
cost of false positives is much higher than the cost of false negatives. The 
second is that they should be especially cautious because it is hard to 
identify excessive prices in practice. The likelihood of making mistakes is 
high because of the lack of a sound definition and the difficulty of 
developing accurate empirical information. They have also determined that 
the administrative cost of regulating the prices of dominant firms is very 
high.  
V. IMPLEMENTING THE UNFAIR PRICING PROVISIONS OF THE AML FOR 
INNOVATION-INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES 
In devising the AML, China looked around the world at the competition 
laws, policies, and institutions adopted by other countries including the 
United States and the European Union.  Since then, Chinese judges and 
officials have made great efforts to study international best practices for 
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competition policy.  Of course, the Chinese competition authorities and 
courts are also making sure to develop antitrust policy that fits with the 
specific circumstances of China, which are unique in a number of 
dimensions. This section considers how to adapt what we have learned 
about the approaches towards excessive pricing to the unique circumstances 
of innovation-intensive industries in China.    
A.  Best Practices for Assessing Excessive Pricing in 
Innovation-Intensive Industries 
In the previous sections we have described the standard international 
best practices concerning excessive pricing in innovation-intensive 
industries and have shown that, at a general level, these practices are 
consistent with sound economic analysis designed to promote economic 
growth and welfare. These best practices can be divided into two categories: 
(1) the circumstances under which investigation of unfair pricing claims 
should be considered for innovation-intensive industries and (2) evaluating 
whether an unfair pricing abuse has occurred for those cases that are 
considered. It is useful to provide a brief summary before we consider 
whether, and to what extent, China should adopt these international 
practices. 
1. The Exceptional Circumstances Screen 
Based on standard international best practices, unfair pricing cases 
should be brought rarely, if ever, against firms in innovation-intensive 
industries. The cost associated with chilling the creation of new 
technologies and products vastly outweighs the benefits of lowering short-
run prices.   
Moreover, holders of intellectual property rights should never be subject 
to an unfair pricing charge if that is the only claim of abuse. Any claims 
concerning pricing abuse should be related to an exclusionary abuse under 
which the intellectual property rights (IPRs) holder has excluded 
competitors from being able to participate in the market and thereby harmed 
competition. It is contrary to the purpose of intellectual property right grants 
to limit the reward that successful creators can receive.  Moreover, it is also 
more difficult than in other cases—and practically impossible—to assess 
whether the prices charged by an IPR holder are excessive. 
In considering both of these principles, it is important to recall that 
competition authorities and courts generally consider unfair pricing cases 
only in exceptional circumstances.  The point above is that, relative to those 
exceptional circumstances, unfair pricing cases should hardly ever be 
brought in innovation-intensive industries and never as a pure unfair pricing 
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claim against firms that hold intellectual property rights. 
2. Identifying an Unfair Pricing Abuse 
The second issue concerns how competition authorities and courts 
should evaluate whether a dominant firm has committed an unfair pricing 
abuse in an innovation-intensive industry in those rare circumstances in 
which they consider these cases. 
The standard test together with the economic analysis of the rewards for 
innovation show that there needs to be a determination that the price is 
excessive relative to the award that successful firms would need to receive 
in order to make socially desirable risky investments in innovation.  In other 
words, the assessment of whether a price is excessive must take into 
account the many failures in such innovation-intensive industries and ensure 
that there are adequate rewards available for the few firms that are 
successful to motivate the many to try.  This is a necessary condition for 
determining whether prices are unfair. 
There then needs to be a further determination that the price is not 
consistent with the value received by the buyer.  For innovation-intensive 
industries assessing this value requires considering the role of new 
technologies and products.  In these cases, the buyer would not have been 
able to obtain any value in the absence of the innovation.  The new 
technology or product would not even have existed.  This makes “unfair” 
pricing claims particularly treacherous and farfetched in this context. 
B.   Applying Best Practices to the Specific Circumstances of China 
China has already made a policy decision to deregulate prices and let 
most prices be determined by the market. Historically, China had a centrally 
planned economy in which prices were set by the central government. In 
1992, at the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, China 
officially set a market-oriented economy as the target of its economic 
reform. 94  As part of this process it gradually removed government control 
over most prices in favor of letting market forces determine prices. 
The NDRC under the Price Law has used its discretion primarily to 
regulate the prices of certain commodities and services that are deemed 
essential to consumers. Table 2 lists the leading products and services 
subject to NDRC price regulation which was published in the NDRC Public 
Notice No.11.95 Notably, the table shows that the NDRC normally regulates 
                                                
94 See Dan Zhu, “Historical Milestones: Socialism Market Economy,” People Daily, 
October 11, 2007, available at http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/104019/104740/8150356.html.   
95 NDRC of People’s Republic of China Public Notice No. 11, Effective on August 1st, 
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the prices of products and services only in areas where market mechanisms 
cannot achieve effective results. The NDRC has rarely regulated the prices 
of a product or service provided by what we would characterize as an 
innovation-intensive industry.96   
Having come to the policy conclusion that China should primarily rely 
on the market to determine prices it would be contradictory, and 
inconsistent with China’s overall path towards economic growth, to use the 
AML to regulate prices except in unusual cases. Therefore, as a general 
matter China’s economic history and policies reinforce the case for 
applying the unfair pricing law only in exceptional circumstances.  
Furthermore, the decision by Chinese policymakers to encourage innovation 
and permit entrepreneurs to earn significant rewards for their creations is 
consistent with not applying the unfair pricing law to innovation-intensive 
industries. There are no sound policy reasons for using antitrust to return to 
an intrusive, regulatory approach to pricing in industries where China has 
removed those controls. 
China has no special situation that would suggest that it should apply 
the unfair pricing law to industries for which intellectual property rights are 
significant.  As we have argued, the costs of reducing the ex-ante incentives 
to create intellectual property through ex post regulation are high—as a 
result of reduced benefits to consumers and slower economic growth. China 
in particular has benefited enormously from technologies based on 
intellectual property rights, ranging from mobile communications to internet, 
pharmaceutical, and biotechnology that have generated many new products 
that have produced massive social value.  
 
 
Table 2: Products and services subject to NDRC price regulation 
 Products and services 
1. Important central reserve materials 
2. State monopoly tobacco 
3. Salt and industrial blasting equipment 
4. Certain chemical fertilizers 
5. Certain important medicines 
6. Natural gas 
                                                                                                                       
2001, available at http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbl/zcfbl2003pro/t20050707_27540.htm 
96 Government regulated prices do not necessarily mean simply controlling or reducing 
the price of products. In some industries in Table 2, prices are actually set jointly by 
government guidance and market mechanism. See State Planning Commission, “The 
Options to Reform the Price Management of Medical Services,” July 20, 2000, available at 
http://www.moh.gov.cn/zhuzhan/wsbmgz/201304/2565dbbdefeb4a5199c4fc7c8f9306b0.sh
tml.     
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7. Important specialized services including financial settlement and 
financial transaction services, engineering investigation and design 
services and certain intermediary services 
8. Electricity 
9. Military supplies 
10. Important transportation services 
11. Basic telecommunication service 
12. Basic postal service 
13. Water supply from state-run or interprovincial water projects 
Source: NDRC (2001)  
 
  
In theory, one could argue that, as a matter of economy policy, China 
could apply excessive pricing regulation to intellectual property rights 
because non-Chinese firms hold most of these rights. The argument would 
be that Chinese businesses and consumers could benefit from lower prices 
in the near term, while China would feel only a portion of the effects of 
reduced innovation since it provides only a partial source of the rewards. 
Such a policy would be short sighted.  Chinese firms are rapidly becoming 
stronger in IP and may become world leaders in some industries. 
 Indigenous innovation is one of the main policy goals in the Twelfth 
Five-Year Plan.97 Many Chinese companies have spent and will continue to 
spend heavily on R&D. Tremendous investment in R&D has fueled the 
rapid growth of China’s technology industry. R&D spending in China is 
expected to reach $284 billion in 2014, up 22 percent from 2012. Compared 
with China, the growth forecast in the U.S. is just 4 percent to $465 billion 
for the same period. China is expected to surpass Europe in R&D spending 
by 2018 and the U.S. by 2022. Imposing caps, particularly low ones, on 
what innovators may charge for their intellectual property would not only 
slow economic progress, but would also discourage Chinese innovators 
from participating in just this sort of research and development.  
Moreover, as the size of China in world markets increases, Chinese 
policies that reduce the rewards from innovation will have a larger impact 
on China itself.  China now accounts for 40 percent of the global 
smartphone market in 2013, and enjoys the highest shipment growth rate in 
the world.98 China’s pharmaceutical market is expected to continue to grow 
                                                
97 See State Council Notice on Indigenous Innovation in the Twelfth Five Year Plan. 
The Chinese version is available at http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2013-
05/29/content_2414100.htm. 
98 See Gao Yuan, “China Now World’s Biggest Smartphone Market,” China Daily, 
November 6, 2013, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2013-
11/06/content_17086026.htm. 
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at a pace of more than 20 percent annually.99 The biotech sector is expected 
to grow at an average annual rate of more than 20 percent from 2013 to 
2015 as planned by the State Council.100 If the rewards from innovation 
were to be discounted, the momentum of those R&D-intensive industries 
would significantly decrease. That will ultimately have a negative impact on 
the nation’s employment rate and consumer welfare.   
The drafters of the AML appear to have anticipated that the unfair 
pricing law—without more—would not apply to intellectual property rights. 
Article 55 of the AML says that  
 
This Law does not govern the conduct of business operators to 
exercise their intellectual property rights under laws and relevant 
administrative regulations on intellectual property rights; however, 
business operators' conduct to eliminate or restrict market 
competition by abusing their intellectual property rights shall be 
governed by this Law. (Emphasis added.). 
 
That is, the unfair pricing law applies to intellectual property only if the 
unfair pricing has an anticompetitive effect as a result of excluding 
competition and harming the competitive process.   
In fact, the European Union has tended to limit the application of the 
unfair pricing law to situations in which there is just such an exclusionary 
effect.  We believe NDRC and the courts should adopt that policy not just 
for intellectual property but for all innovation-intensive industries. As a 
matter of economic policy there are several reasons for restricting unfair 
pricing claims to cases where the unfair pricing is part of a strategy that 
includes abusive exclusionary behavior that would distort the competitive 
process and harm consumers. First, preventing the distortion of the 
competitive process is more likely to create benefits that would outweigh 
the adverse effect on innovation than shifting profit from seller to buyer. 
Second, without requiring an anticompetitive effect, it is possible that unfair 
pricing claims could be mainly employed by buyers to shift profits from 
sellers.  That could result in rent-seeking behavior by businesses that would 
invest in trying to persuade courts and the NDRC to give them a better 
deal.101 
                                                
99 See IMAP, “Pharmaceuticals & Biotech Industry Global Report-2011,” available at 
http://www.imap.com/imap/media/resources/IMAP_PharmaReport_8_272B8752E0FB3.pd
f. 
100 See Xinhua, “China to Boost Biotech Industry,” January 6, 2013, available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/sci/2013-01/06/c_132084198.htm. 
101 This also presents the courts and the NDRC with a conundrum. Since unfairly low 
prices are also unlawful under Article 17 they would need to consider whether the buyer is 
using its market power, perhaps together with pursuing claims before the court and 
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C.  The NDRC’s Unfair Pricing Test 
The NDRC has adopted guidelines for assessing unfair pricing that 
appear to differ from the standard test based on United Brands that is used 
in other jurisdictions. According to Article 11 of the Anti-Price Monopoly 
Regulations that the NDRC issued on December 29, 2010 and that took 
effect in February 2011,102  
 
in determining if prices are unfairly high or low, the enforcement 
agency must consider: (i) whether the sales price or purchase price is 
markedly higher or lower than the price at which other business 
operators sell or purchase the same type of commodities; (ii) where 
costs are essentially stable, whether the sales price was raised or the 
purchase price lowered beyond the normal range; (iii) whether the level 
of the price increase for the sale of commodities is markedly higher than 
the cost increase range, or whether the range of the price reduction for 
the purchase of commodities is markedly greater than the transaction 
counterparty’s cost reduction range; and (iv) other related factors. 
 
The first factor considered by NDRC focuses on price comparisons.  As 
we discussed earlier, such price comparisons can be helpful for assessing 
whether the price charged is significantly greater than cost and whether it 
reflects economic value provided by the seller.  However, it is common in 
competitive markets for prices to differ between firms for pro-competitive 
reasons.103 That is particularly true in business-to-business markets for 
intermediate goods in which the parties engage in private negotiation and 
prices are not public. Such price differences are common in China.104 
                                                                                                                       
regulator, to secure an unfairly low price. 
102 See Anti-Price Monopoly Regulations, NDRC Order No. 7, December 29, 2010, 
available at http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2011-01/04/content_1777969.htm. 
103 See Massimo Motta (2004), Competition Policy: Theory and Practice, Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, at pp. 493-498; see also Michael E. Levine (2002), 
“Price Discrimination without Market Power,” Yale Journal on Regulation, 19, 1; William 
J. Baumol and Daniel G. Swanson (2003), “The New Economy and Ubiquitous 
Competitive Price Discrimination: Identifying Defensible Criteria of Market Power,” 
Antitrust Law Journal, 70(3), 661-685. 
104For example, large retail stores such as Walmart get discounts from suppliers which 
make it possible for Walmart to offer consumers lower prices and better quality in China. 
See Walmart Shopping Mall Ignite Business in Yanqing, Sina, September 1, 2009, 
available at http://travel.sina.com.cn/news/2009-09-01/1007104419.shtml. To take another 
common example parks and museums offer discounted prices to senior citizens, students 
and other special group of consumers. See China National Tourism Administration, 2012 
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Reliable price comparisons must compare like-to-like and therefore account 
for at least three sources of differences: (1) Price comparisons must 
consider differences between the products and services offered by different 
sellers. (2) Price comparisons should account for differences between 
buyers including size and bargaining power. (3) Price comparisons must 
account for differences in the terms of trade and contract details between 
different buyers, since some buyers may pay higher prices but either get 
greater value from the seller or impose more costs on the seller than other 
buyers.  
In competitive markets, bargaining between buyers and sellers results in 
some buyers securing lowers prices than other buyers. An antitrust policy 
that required the seller to extend the discount it is offering one firm to all 
other firms could prevent the seller from offering or agreeing to this 
discount for anyone. That could harm consumers. Suppose, for example, 
that a large buyer insists on a discount for the higher volume and the greater 
revenue certainty it brings the seller. An antitrust policy that required the 
seller to extend the same discount to the larger firm that it offers to other 
firms could prevent the seller from offering this discount, resulting in less 
production and higher consumer prices than is otherwise necessary. It could 
also give the seller additional negotiating power by arguing that government 
policy prevents it from offering a discount. 
The second two factors focus on the relationship between price and cost.  
As we noted earlier, in many markets there is not a close correspondence 
between prices and costs, especially marginal costs. That is particularly true 
in innovation-intensive industries, those based on intellectual property, and 
those based on multi-sided platforms including many Internet-based 
companies. In those situations there are no competitive reasons why prices 
and costs should strictly follow each other. 
The second two factors also do not consider the possibility that prices 
may change because of demand and the value that buyers place on the 
product. They therefore ignore two important aspects of the price system. 
First, prices help allocate scarce resources to their highest valued use. When 
demand increases without a corresponding increase in supply, prices rise so 
that the buyers who value the product most highly obtain the limited supply.  
Without the price increase there would be the queues and rationing that 
arose under certain centralized price settings. Second, prices provide signals 
for entry and innovation. Prices signal firms to enter and for innovators to 
consider substitute products and cost-saving innovations.  If prices were not 
allowed to adjust, this signaling function of the price system would be lost. 
                                                                                                                       
Benefit Program of China Tourism Day: Discount Prices to Senior Citizen, Students and 
Special Consumer Groups, May 17, 2012, available at http://www.cnta.com/html/2012-
5/2012-5-17-15-40-91650_1.html.     
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The NDRC’s regulations “prove too much” in the sense that they 
would find very common market pricing practices unfair.  The NDRC has 
so far followed international practice in bringing few unfair pricing claims 
under the AML and has maintained the long-standing policy of letting 
markets decide prices.  The NDRC’s regulations could be improved, and 
made consistent with its overall reliance on markets, by explicitly 
incorporating the economic value prong of the United Brands test, 
acknowledging the importance of the demand side of the market in 
determining prices, and recognizing that the price comparisons must 
compare like-to-like (and therefore account for differences). The NDRC 
may intend to consider these issues, as well as the specific complications 
associated with innovation-intensive industries and the presence or absence 
of exclusionary conduct, under the final provision in the regulations 
addressing “other relevant factors”.105 
     
D.  Excessive Pricing Enforcement Under the AML 
Thus far unfair pricing under the AML has made just two limited 
appearances on the antitrust stage in China. The decisions in both cases 
depart from the best practices followed in most leading antitrust 
jurisdictions. 
 The Guangdong Price Bureau, following the NDRC regulations and 
guided by it fined two companies that were under common ownership for 
charging unfairly high prices for “river sand.”106 River sand is a type of 
sand from riverbeds that is used for construction material such as plaster 
and mortar.  The Guangdong Price Bureau compared the prices charged by 
these two companies with companies in other river sand markets and found 
that their prices were higher. It also found that they had increased their 
prices by almost three times their increases in costs (54.4 percent versus 20 
percent). 
                                                
105  Article 26 of the NDRC’ s Anti-Price Monopoly Regulations reiterates the 
sensitivity to the exercise of intellectual property rights reflected in Article 55 of the AML.  
It states: “These Rules are not applicable to conduct of undertakings to exercise their 
intellectual property rights in accordance with the intellectual property laws and relevant 
administrative regulations however these Rules are applicable to monopolistic pricing 
conduct of undertakings that abuse their intellectual property rights to eliminate or restrict 
market competition” (emphasis added). 
106 NDRC, “Guangdong Punished Sea Sand Price Monopoly Case to Guarantee the 
Smooth Proceeding of National Important Project Construction”, October 26, 2012 
available at http://jjs.ndrc.gov.cn/gzdt/t20121026_510834.htm. The Guangdong Price 
Bureau’s river-sand case is the only application of Article 17(1) of the AML by the 
Chinese price bureaus or by the NDRC itself that we have identified. 
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We do not have access to the Guangdong Price Bureau’s decision or 
knowledge of its reasoning. Based on what is in the public record it does not 
appear that the “circumstances” identified by the Guangdong Price 
Bureau are “exceptional.” It is common for dominant firms to charge 
more than other dominant firms in other markets. Dominant firms raise their 
prices more than increases in costs for a variety of reasons, including 
increases in demand. It would not seem that there are permanent barriers to 
entry into the business because of legal or regulatory reasons.  The 
Guangdong Price Bureau may have focused on the river sand industry for 
general economic policy reasons and added the AML claim for emphasis or 
it may have had other reasons that we do not know about. 
For our analysis of innovation-intensive industries Huawei vs. 
InterDigital is the more relevant matter.107 InterDigital develops wireless 
technologies and licenses its patents on these technologies. The Shenzhen 
Intermediate Court heard two separate cases. There was an antitrust case in 
which Huawei claimed that InterDigital was offering a license to its 
Standards-Essential Patents (SEPs) at rates that were discriminatory and 
excessive, imposed unfair trading conditions, and engaged in tying and 
refusal to deal. There was also a contract case in which Huawei claimed that 
InterDigital breached its obligation to provide a fair reasonable and non-
discriminatory (FRAND) license under its agreement with the relevant 
SSO. 
The Shenzen Intermediate Court ruled against InterDigital in both cases. 
The court did not publish its decisions because of confidential information 
but the judges who decided the case have published two articles that briefly 
summarize their analysis and findings. In the antitrust case the court found, 
among other things, that InterDigital had offered its patents at excessive 
prices to Huawei in violation of Article 17(1) and at discriminatory prices in 
violation of Article 17(6) of the AML.108 In the FRAND case the court 
found that the appropriate FRAND rate was a small fraction of what 
InterDigital had asked Huawei to pay. 109  The antitrust and FRAND 
                                                
107 There were two decisions regarding the abuse of dominance claim and the FRAND 
claim respectively. The case involving the abuse of dominance claim is 
Shenzhongfazhiminchuzi No. 857 (2011), and the case involving the FRAND claim is 
Shenzhongfazhiminchuzi No. 858 (2011). Neither decision is public.  
108See Ye Ruosi, Zhu Jianjun & Chen Wenquan (2013), “Determination of Whether 
Abuse of Dominance by SEP Owners Constitutes Monopoly: Comments on the Antitrust 
Lawsuit Huawei v. InterDigital,” Electronics Intellectual Property, vol.3. See also the 
decision summarized in the InterDigital’s annual report. InterDigital 2013 Annual Report 
filed Feb. 26, 2013, available at http://ir.interdigital.com/secfiling.cfm?filingID=1405495-
13-10&CIK=1405495. 
109 See Ye Ruosi, Zhu Jianjun & Chen Wenquan (2013), “The Implementation of 
FRAND in the Litigations Involving SEP’s Royalty Rates: Comments on SEP Royalty 
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decisions were both upheld by the Guangdong High People’s Court.110 The 
parties settled the matter and there were no further appeals.111 
The InterDigital matter is the only Chinese court case to our knowledge 
that has involved an application of the unfair pricing law to an innovation-
intensive industry.  It is difficult to conclude much about the direction that 
the Chinese courts will take on the application Article 17(1) to IPR given 
that the unfair pricing claim was just one of several antitrust claims; much 
of the analysis of prices themselves occurred in the FRAND contract case; 
the decisions themselves have not been published; and the decisions have 
not been heard by the Supreme People’s Court.  Moreover, InterDigital 
does not seem to have submitted sufficient evidence about its licensing 
agreements to permit the court to make a fully informed analysis. 
Subject to these caveats, one interesting aspect of the decision is that it 
does not appear to have expressly addressed Article 55 of the AML, which 
exempts the exercise of IPRs from antitrust scrutiny unless those rights are 
used to eliminate or restrict market competition.  It may be that the court 
concluded that the extreme disparities it found in rates charged to different 
licensees had such an anticompetitive effect, but that is not clear from the 
information about the case that is publicly available.112  If the court did not 
make such a finding, it would be hard to reconcile the decision with Article 
55. In that case, the court’s approach would also be inconsistent with the 
approach in most other jurisdictions of limiting excessive pricing cases 
regarding IPRs to situations in which a firm pursued an exclusionary 
strategy.113 
Nevertheless, the judges for the Shenzen Intermeditate Court made a 
conscientious effort to address a set of difficult issues concerning 
negotiating FRAND royalty rates for SEPs.  This Chinese court is not the 
first to find this topic challenging. We are therefore optimistic that the 
Chinese courts will find the approach towards unfair pricing followed in 
other jurisdictions, and in particular towards innovative-intensive industries, 
helpful in shaping the case law on the application of Article 17(1).     
 
                                                                                                                       
Lawsuit Huawei v. InterDigital,” Electronics Intellectual Property, vol.4. 
110 See Zhu Jianjun, “Determination of Whether Abuse of Dominance by SEP Owners 
Constitutes Monopoly: Comments on the Antitrust Infringement Case Huawei v. 
InterDigital,” China Intellectual Property News, December 5, 2013, available at 
http://www.cipnews.com.cn/showArticle.asp?Articleid=29779. 
111  “InterDigital Settles with Huawei,” WIPR, January 7, 2014, available at 
http://www.worldipreview.com/news/interdigital-settles-with-huawei.  
112 The existence of such disparities would not by itself, however, demonstrate that 
competition was eliminated or excluded in handset manufacturing. 
113 InterDigital also did not have a monopoly over an entire industry like the post 
office. It was one of a number of entities that had SEPs over mobile wireless technologies.  
52 Economic Framework for Assessing Unfair Pricing under the AML   
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
China is at the very beginning of developing the best way to apply its 
new antitrust laws to its economy.  Chinese courts and regulators should 
certainly not simply parrot the practice of other countries, but China can 
learn from the many decades of experience and numerous cases considered 
by courts and competition authorities, particularly the large ones in the 
European Union and the United States.  China carefully modeled its laws 
from elements of these jurisdictions, and the courts and competition 
authorities are looking at international practice.  It therefore makes sense, in 
the case of unfair pricing, to consider how competition case law and policy 
has evolved in other jurisdictions. Both the practice of other jurisdictions 
and sound economic analysis recommends that China should rarely if ever 
apply the unfair pricing law to innovation-intensive industries unless the 
unfair pricing is related to an exclusionary practice that has an 
anticompetitive effect.  For the same reasons, and as apparently required 
under Article 55 of the AML, the experience of other jurisdictions and 
sound economic analysis strongly suggests that the unfair pricing law 
should not apply to intellectual property except when the unfair price is part 
of an exclusionary abuse.  
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